

THE
MAXIMS
OF THE
GOVERNMENT
OF
V E N I C E.

IN AN
Advice to the Republick;

How it ought to govern it self both
inwardly and outwardly, in order
to perpetuate its Dominion.

In which are likewise consider'd the several
Interests of all the Princes of *Europe*,
with respect to the Affairs of *Italy*.

By Father PAUL, the Servite Monk, and
Counsellor of State to the Republick.

Written by Publick Order.

Done into *English* from the *Italian*.

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THE
PREFACE.

THE following Treatise is no less singular for its Subject, than famous for its Author. We seldom find Persons employed by Publick Authority, to enquire into the Defects and Inconveniences of the Constitution of a Government, and to consider of proper ways how to amend them, to examine into the Interests which a State has with its neighbouring Princes, and to lay down Rules to be observ'd in all Treaties with them. However, this is what the Republick of *Venice* has, in former times, thought fit to do, they having for this end address'd themselves to their great Oracle of Wisdom and Prudence, the renowned Father *Paul*, a Person eminent in the Republick of Learning for his many excellent Writings, but more particularly known here in *England*

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by his famous History of the Council of *Trent*.

He was a Man universally learn'd in all the Sciences, both Sacred and Prophane; but most excellently well vers'd in History, and the Canon Law. He was in so great Esteem in his own Country for his vast Learning and Judgment, that the Republick of *Venice* pitched upon him, as the fittest Person within their Dominions, to manage the great Controversy they had, about a hundred Years ago, with Pope *Paul* the Vth, who had put the whole Republick under Sentence of Excommunication. It was upon this occasion, that Father *Paul* was taken into the Service of the Republick, and made one of their Counsellors of State. He managed the Interest of the Republick against the Court of *Rome*, with such Strength of Reason and Argument, that altho' the learned'st Pens of the Age were set to work against him, yet they were never able to confute his Writings. So that the Adversaries of the Republick finding that this Method of answering the Father proved altogether unsuccessful, they resolved to change their Batteries, and to employ other Weapons for stopping his Mouth.

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And accordingly, soon after the first Heats about this Affair began to rise to a greater height, the Inquisitors of State received Intelligence from their Spies, that there was a Design laid against Father *Paul's* Life, upon which they gave him a Caution to be upon his Guard. But the Father, trusting to his own Innocence, and thinking himself in no manner of Danger, continued to walk the Streets with his usual Freedom. However, one Evening as he was returning to his Convent, he was assaulted in the Streets by five Assassins, who gave him three Wounds with Stilettoes. The Republick was so concern'd at the loss they were like to sustain by Father *Paul's* Death, that the Senate order'd all the most eminent Physicians about *Venice* to attend him in his Cure. And he having, by their Assistance, recover'd of his Wounds, the Senate, to prevent any such Danger to the Father's Life for the future, appointed him a Guard for his Person, and a House near the Palace of *St. Mark*, where he might remain in Safety. But the Father being unwilling to change his course of Life, intreated that he might be allowed to continue in the Monastery among his Brethren, with whom he had lived so

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comfortably until that time. The Senate seeing the Father so earnest to continue in his Monastick Life, granted him his Request. But for the Security of his Person, they caused some little Additions to be made to his Lodgings in the Convent, that by the means of a little Gallery, and a Ladder, he might have the Convenience of taking Boat at his own Chambers; and that when it happen'd that he was to return from the Publick Service late at Night, he might pass directly out of his *Gondola* into his own Apartment, without crossing the Streets, or being seen by any Person.

After this Accident happen'd to Father *Paul*, he continu'd to serve the Republick in the Office of Counsellor of State for the space of sixteen Yeats, during which time nothing was transacted in the State, without being first imparted to him. And the Father's Judgment of things was in so great Esteem, that there seldom happen'd any Matter of Consequence in all the Cities under the Jurisdiction of the Republick, wherein he was not consulted; as in Testaments, Marriages, Successions, Feoffments, and even in Points of Honour. In all which Matters Father *Paul's*
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Answer's were always regarded as Oracles.

The Republick was so fully satisfied of the Father's Fidelity to the Interest of his Country, and so sensible of the Advantages which the Publick reap'd from his Labours, that they honour'd him with a Privilege, which was never granted to any other Counsellor of State, and which but a very few even of the Nobles themselves enjoy. The Senate order'd him to have free Access to the Archives of the Republick, which is undoubtedly the greatest Treasure of Political Maxims and Instructions that is any where extant in the World. For here are deposited the Fundamental Laws of the Republick, the Maxims of State by which it is govern'd, all its Treaties of War and Peace, all its Alliances with Princes, and the Reports which all their Ambassadors make, at their Return from their Embassies, of the present Posture of Affairs in the several Kingdoms where they have resided.

Father *Paul* having got free Admittance to the Publick Archives, he, by his assiduous Application, and with the Advantages of a clear and solid Judgment, of a deep Penetration of

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Mind, and of a most prodigious Memory, soon laid up a considerable Stock of Political Learning. And it appearing in his daily Consultations upon the Publick Affairs, that he was thoroughly well acquainted with every thing relating to the Government and Interest of the Republick; the Inquisitors of State desired him to draw up in Writing his Opinion, as to the Measures which the Republick ought to follow, both in its Foreign and Domestick Concerns, in order to make its Dominion perpetual. The Advice which the Father drew up, in obedience to the Commands of his Superiors, is what I here present to the Reader. It was received by the Senate of *Venice* with great Applause, and carefully deposited in their Archives. If we look into the History of their Government, we shall find that the *Venetians* have all along closely pursued the Measures which the Father here recommends to them. And even at this Day, they still have recourse to this Advice, as to their Oracle of State.

This Treatise for a long time lay hid in the Archives of the Republick, the Senators not being willing it should come into the Hands of any other Persons, besides those

those who have the chief Management of the Publick Affairs. But in process of time, Copies of it began to creep abroad in Manuscript, and at last it was privately printed some Years ago. However, the Book is still rare to be met with, and has fallen into the Hands but of a few Persons. The *Sieur Amelot de la Houssaie*, who made a diligent Search after all the Books that treat of the Government of *Venice*, and who has translated into *French* several Treatises of *Father Paul*, did never light upon this Discourse, which would have been of singular Use to him in his Design. It would have given him a great insight into the Government and Interest of that Republick; and would have set him right as to some Mistakes he is fallen into, in the Account he gives of the Interest of that Republick with other Princes.

For when he comes to speak of the Interest of the Republick with the Pope, he tells us, that the *Venetians* have it for a Maxim, not to keep any Pensioners at the Court of *Rome*, nor to concern themselves in the Election of a Pope; that they content themselves with holding a fair general Correspondence with the Popes, by sending them magnificent Embassies, and

receiving their Nephews into the number of their Nobles. He adds, that the Popes, to requite this Civility, always include the *Venetians* when they make a Promotion of Cardinals for the Crowns; but that the Senate does not care to name their Subjects whom they desire to have advanced to the Cardinalship, for fear of creating Jealousies among the Noble Families. 'Tis true, the Pope seldom makes a Promotion of Cardinals for the Crowns, but some *Venetian* Subject is of the number. However, this is not paying the same respect to the Republick, which the Popes pay to the Crown'd Heads. For when the Pope makes a Promotion of Cardinals in favour of the Crowns, he gives the Cap to the Subject whom the King names; but when he makes a *Venetian* Cardinal, the Pope himself chuses the Person, without any regard to the Recommendation of the Republick. And it is for this reason, that the *Venetian* Cardinals have no Dependence on the Senate, as the Cardinals of other Nations have on their Sovereigns, who procured them the Cardinal's Cap. It is upon this account, that the Republick of *Venice* has no Faction in the Conclave, as the Emperor, and the Kings of
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France and *Spain* have. The *Venetian* Cardinals, as soon as they are promoted, list themselves either into the Faction of the Pope who created them, or into some other Faction, according as their Interest or Inclination leads them. They are so far from having any Dependence on the Senate of *Venice*, that the Ambassadors of the Republick complain, that the Cardinals of their own Nation are the most violent Opposers of every thing that is for the Grandeur, or Interest of the Republick.

This is the true reason, why the Republick of *Venice* has so few Pensioners at the Court of *Rome*; because all their Ecclesiastical Subjects expect their Advancement to the Honours and Dignities of the Church from the Favours and Good-will of the Pope alone, and not from the Protection of the Senate. This is the real Cause, why the Republick does not meddle in the Election of a Pope; because it has not the Votes of the *Venetian* Cardinals at its Command, as other Sovereign Princes have those of their own Subjects. But the Republick is so far from acting with this Indifferency upon Reasons of State, as the *Sieur Amelot* says, that they complain of this undutiful Beha-

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Behaviour of their own Subjects, as one of the greatest Grievances they have at the Court of *Rome*. And the Senate gives strict Injunctions to all the Ambassadors of the Republick, to try to get this Abuse remedied, by gaining over all the *Venetian* Cardinals, and Prelates, to an absolute Dependence on the Senate^a.

There is no State has greater reason to concern it self in the Election of a Pope than the Republick of *Venice*, because of the many Differences it has to adjust with the Court of *Rome*, on account of the Confines of their Territories, and other common Concerns. Father *Paul*, in this Treatise, advises them to use all possible Endeavours to procure the Election of a Pope that is well inclined to the Republick, that they may be able to obtain of him all the Prerogatives and Privileges which are granted to Crown'd Heads; such as the having always a Cardinal's Cap for one of their Subjects, whenever the Subjects of other Princes are promoted to that Dignity; the getting the Nuncios

^a For a fuller Information of all these Matters, the Reader may be pleas'd to consult the Lives of the *Venetian* Cardinals, in the Present State of *Rome*, printed in the Year 1706.

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residing at *Venice* to be advanced directly from their Nunciature to the Cardinalship; and some other Demands which they insist on, to preserve the equality of Rank they claim among Kings. Whoever has had an Opportunity of perusing any of the Reports which the *Venetian* Ambassadors to the Court of *Rome* have given into the Senate, at their Return from their Embassies, would there see with what Zeal and Fervour they all labour to obtain those Privileges from the Popes, which Father *Paul* here recommends to them so earnestly to insist upon. And his Excellency *Signor Nicolo Erizzo*, one of the Ambassadors Extraordinary from the Republick to her present Majesty of *Great Britain*, in the Report which he gave in to the Senate about three Years ago, at his return from the Court of *Rome*, shews of what great advantage it would be to the Republick, if the Popes could be prevail'd with, when they make a Promotion of Cardinals for the Crowns, to allow the Senate to name their own Subject, whom they desire to have advanced to the Cardinalship, as Kings do theirs. And in case this cannot be obtain'd, he advises the Senate to insist on getting at least a liberty to name four Subjects,
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out of which the Pope may chuse one to be made a Cardinal, as is practis'd in the choice of the *Venetian* Auditor of the *Ruota*.

This Discourse of Father Paul's contains a great many remarkable things concerning the Constitution, it lays down Maxims to be observed in the Government of its Subjects, and considers at large the Interest of the Republick, not only with the Princes of *Italy*, but with all foreign Potentates. The Transactions of that Commonwealth are kept so secret, and every thing they design is hid under so many false Pretexts and Appearances, that it is almost impossible to know their true Intentions. I look upon this Treatise therefore to be the more valuable, because it helps us to discover the true Springs of all their Counsels, let them be hid under never so thick a Cloud of Appearances. It gives us at the same time, a clear and distinct View of the several Interests of all the Princes of *Italy*, and lets us see what are the likeliest Motives to prevail with them to engage in a War, or to observe an exact Neutrality. For this reason, I thought it truly a Loss to the Publick, that such an useful Treatise as this should lie hid during the present War in *Italy*.

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ly, in which several of the Princes of that Country are actually engaged, and others have been earnestly sollicitated by both Parties to declare themselves. I was therefore induced to translate it into the Language of a Nation, which is so greatly interested in the present War, and which has in her hands the Ballance of *Europe*, and may turn the Scales which way she pleases.

In my Translation I have kept close to the Original, and have made no other Alterations in the Book, than by dividing it into Chapters and Paragraphs, which, I think, will make it more agreeable to the Reader. There are some things mention'd in this Treatise, relating to the Councils, Magistrates, and Courts of Judicature in *Venice*, which every Reader will not readily understand, unless he is somewhat vers'd in the Historians that treat of the Constitution and Government of that Republick. I have therefore thought fit, for the conveniency of such Persons as have not had an opportunity of being much conversant in those matters, to set down some Marginal Notes, for the explanation of such things as may not perhaps be obvious to every Reader. Whoever is desirous to be more fully informed

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informed of the Government of that Republick, may have recourse to the *Sieur Amelot's* History of the Government of *Venice*; who has made a very compleat Collection of all those matters out of the *Venetian* Historians. Or if there are any Persons who are more curious than to take things at second Hand, and desire to have them from the Fountain Head, let them consult *Donato Gianotti* in his Book *della Repubblica d'Venetiani*.

The Knowledge of the History, Government, and Interests of foreign Nations, is, in my opinion, one of the best Accomplishments for qualifying a Gentleman to serve his own Country. To get an exact Information of these things, is the great and main End of travelling into foreign Countries. Most Travellers, who are come to Years of Judgment and Discretion, and who seek more after Improvement than Pleasure in their Travels, are wont to remark in foreign Parts, what they think deserves most their Attention, or what they judge may be profitable or delightful to their Fellow Subjects. Some observe the publick and private Edifices, others the Remains of Antiquity, and others again the Laws and Government, the Commerce and natural Products of the

the Countries thro' which they pass. We find the Antients were always diligent Enquirers into the Laws and Governments of other Countries, by which they learn'd to correct what was amiss in their own Constitution, and to avoid the Inconveniences which they saw others liable to. The *Romans*, when they laid the first Foundations of their Commonwealth, sent Persons into *Greece* to collect all the most useful Laws and Customs that were to be found among the *Grecian* Republicks. And these were the first Beginnings of that excellent Body of the *Roman* Laws, which is still at this day almost universally received as the true Standard of Equity and Reason for deciding all Causes. *Aristotle* was so sensible of the great Usefulness of this sort of Knowledge, that he compos'd particular Books of the Customs and Governments of all the Commonwealths that were extant in his time, and came within the reach of his Knowledge.

The Frame and Government of the Republick of *Venice* is thought to be no less worthy of the Curiosity of our Times; than the Commonwealths of *Rome* and *Lacedæmon* were of the Attention of former Ages. Altho' this Republick has been declining for some time

time past, yet it is still considerable for its Majesty, Antiquity, and the Form of its Government, which is celebrated as a Master-piece in Politicks. This Republick has gather'd together all the Political Maxims that were in vogue among the *Grecian* Commonwealths, and it seems to have pick'd out the Commonwealth of *Lacedæmon* for the Pattern which it delights most to imitate in its Civil Administration. But the Republick of *Venice* has this Advantage over all the antient Republicks, that it has preserv'd itself longer than any of the most powerful Commonwealths in former Ages. The Commonwealth of *Lacedæmon* did not last above seven hundred Years; and the famous Commonwealth of *Rome*, the Queen of the World, was hardly able to maintain her Liberty full five hundred Years; whereas it is near thirteen hundred Years since the Commonwealth of *Venice* had its first beginning.

'Tis true, that, since its first Foundation, it has undergone several Changes in the Form of its Government. The Republick was at first a perfect Democracy, while it continued under the Government of its Consuls and Tribunes. Afterwards it changed into a Monarchy, when the People chose

chose their Doges with an absolute and unlimited Power. Then, after some hundreds of Years, the People began to be weary of this Administration, and reassumed the Power into their own hands. However, they thought fit still to elect a Prince, to give the greater credit to all their Publick Affairs; but they limited and restrained his Power in such a manner, that they left him nothing besides the empty Title, and the Precedency; the Great Council, which consisted of about four hundred and seventy Citizens, chosen out of the Body of the People, having taken into its hands the Management of all the publick Concerns. *Venice* continued in this State of *Democracy* till the Year 1297, when the Doge *Pietro Gradenigo* procured the Government of the Republick to be model'd into the Form in which we see it at present. A Law was then enacted, bearing that all those who were Members of the Great Council that Year, or had sat in it any time within the four preceding Years, they and their Posterity should always be Members of the Great Council, without any new Election; and that all others of what Quality soever, whether Nobles or Plebeians, (those were called Nobles,

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who were descended of the antient Tribunes) should be for ever excluded from having any share in the Government. By this Law, the Sovereign Power was taken from the People, and put into the hands of a certain number of Families. And the Republick has continued under this Aristocratical Form of Government, for above four hundred Years. The Republick of *Venice*, notwithstanding all these Changes in the Form of its Government, and the Submissions it has been obliged to make to the Emperors for their Protection, has still maintain'd itself a free Sovereign State, having never been conquer'd by any foreign Power, nor brought into subjection by any of its own Citizens. And this long duration of the Republick can be ascribed to nothing else, but to the Wisdom and Prudence of its Councils, which appear indeed to be wonderful in all the Parts of the Constitution.

If we look into the Method which the *Venetians* use in electing their Magistrates, we shall there discover a most wonderful Care and Vigilance to avoid Corruption and Bribery in Elections, to prevent Party and Faction among the Nobles. The Candidates in Elections, whatever secret Sollicitations

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rations they may use among their Friends on the *Broglio* *, yet they are not seen to go publickly about from House to House, begging a Vote, as if it were an Alms. They do not send their Emissaries abroad to proclaim aloud in the Ears of the People, that their Competitors are *Rogues*, and *Villains*, and *Traitors* to their Country. If such infamous Practices as these were in the least connived at in *Venice*, their City would be daily filled with Murders, and their Republick soon tore in pieces by Feuds and Diffensions among the Nobles. To prevent therefore the fatal Consequences of such immoral and unchristian Practices in Popular Elections, the *Venetians* have made severe Laws against all manner of canvassing or making interest for Places. And besides, they have so contrived the way and manner of their Elections, that they have made it almost impossible for the Electors to form themselves into Parties for any Candidate whatsoever, because of the uncertainty to whose lot it will fall to be Candidates for the Place. The Votes are likewise collected with so much secrecy, that it is impossible for one Man to know how another has voted. And this

* A publick Place near St. Mark's Church, where the Nobles walk.

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Secrecy in voting cuts off a great many Occasions of Grudges and Animosities among the Nobles, which would otherwise happen, if it were known how every one voted in Elections.

The Laws of the Republick not only restrain the canvassing for Places, but likewise forbid all Compliments of Congratulation to Persons that are elected into Offices. The Occasion of this Law, was an antient Custom among the Nobles, that when any of them were chosen into a new Office, as soon as the Election was over, they went and posted themselves in a convenient Place, where they might be seen by all the Nobles as they came out of the Great Council. And every one went to wish the new Magistrate joy of his Office, making solemn Protertations that he had befriended him in his Election, altho' perhaps he had given his Vote against him. These Compliments were so full of Disingenuity, and accompanied with so much fordid and fulsom Flattery, fitter to proceed from the Mouths of the cringing Multitude, than to be utter'd by grave Senators, that the *Censors* drew up a Law for abolishing them intirely; which Law was pass'd in the Senate, and

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and ratified in the Great Council, with a general Applause.

The Election of Magistrates is chiefly committed to the Great Council, which is the Base and Foundation of the Government of the Republick, it being compos'd of all the Nobles that are past five and twenty Years of Age. But this Council is too numerous an Assembly to consult about matters that require a serious Deliberation. And therefore all Affairs of great importance are reserv'd to the Senate, where Matters are transacted with greater maturity of deliberation, and in a less tumultuary manner, than in the Great Council. There are likewise some Offices of the greatest Trust which are reserv'd to the Senate to dispose of; such as the chief Command of the Forces by Sea or Land. It is the Senate that names all the *Sages* * of the Republick, who are as it were the prime Ministers of State, they having the chief direction and management of all the publick Affairs. The Ambassadors to foreign Courts are named by the Senate. It is the Senate alone that has power to deliberate about Peace and War, to conclude Truces and Alliances, to appoint Ways and Means for raising

* *Savil.*

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of Money, and to enact new Laws. 'Tis true, the Council of Ten has a vast Authority to treat of Peace and War, and to enter into Alliances with Princes, without the participation of the Senate. But it seldom makes use of this Power, except in extraordinary cases, where the Safety of the Commonwealth depends on a quick dispatch of Business, and a great Secrecy in Counsels.

The *Venetians* shew no less Prudence in the choice of their Magistrates, than in the manner of electing them. They do not admit their Nobles to Offices of Trust, till they are pretty well advanced in Years, and have attain'd to a competent Knowledge in State Affairs. The Nobles do not enter into the Great Council before they are full five and twenty Years old, and they are not capable of being chosen into the Senate till they are past thirty. They mount gradually from a lower degree of Trust to a higher; and are not admitted to the greatest Posts in the Republick, till they have acquir'd a great Stock of Experience in Matters of Government, and have given sufficient Proofs of their Conduct and Integrity in Posts of a lesser importance. And that the Nobles may the more easily

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easily attain to a thorough Knowledge of the Publick Affairs, before they come to have the Management and Direction of them, it is very wisely order'd by the Republick, that a great many Nobles shall, by virtue of their Offices, be entitl'd to assist in the Senate, and to be present at all its Deliberations, without having a Right to vote in any thing that is laid before them. The Design of this is to train up the young Nobility in the Art of Government, to let them in to the Knowledge of the Affairs of State, before they come to sit at the Helm, and govern the Republick. This prevents a great Inconvenience, which otherwise would be unavoidable, by the frequent change of the Senators, and other Magistrates, if they were succeeded in their Offices by Persons who are altogether unacquainted with the publick Transactions. But this Method supplies the Republick with a constant and uninterrupted Succession of able Statesmen. When one Officer of State is removed, he is succeeded by another, who, if he has not already serv'd in the same Post, yet is no Novice in the Affairs of State, he having assisted several Years perhaps at all the Deliberations of the Senate.

So that he is thoroughly vers'd in the Interests and Maxims of the Republick, and will, in all likelihood, pursue the same Measures that were carried on by his Predecessor.

What a vast difference must there needs be, between a new Ministry of this sort, where the Ministers are thus prepared by a previous Knowledge of every thing relating to the Interest of their Country, before they are admitted to govern it; and a new Ministry, where the Ministers perhaps have never extended their thoughts beyond the Concerns of their private Families, have never studied the Maxims of their own Government, nor inquired into the Interests of other Princes. Wherever such Men are admitted into the Ministry, who are perfect Novices in all Political Affairs, let them be Men of never so great Integrity, of never so prodigious natural Parts, yet the Commonwealth will always be in hazard of suffering by their Management, till they have acquir'd some Years Experience. It must certainly therefore be a great Happiness in a Constitution, to provide that Subjects be train'd up in the Knowledge of the Interest, and publick Concerns of
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their Country ; that whenever Ministers of State are rendred unfit for Service thro' Old Age or Infirmary, there may be always ready at hand a constant Supply of able Persons, who are well grounded in Political Learning, and who are thoroughly acquainted with the thread of all the publick Transactions.

It is likewise a thing highly worthy our Observation, the great Care and Application of the Senate of *Venice*, to preserve a perfect Harmony and Concord between all the Councils of the Republick, to cultivate a good Correspondence among all those that have any share in the Publick Government. This Republick is far from following that State Maxim, *Divide & Impera*, in the mistaken Sense of it, which is so much in vogue in some Countries, of keeping up Factions and Parties among those who have the Administration of the Publick Affairs. They are sensible, that there is nothing more dangerous to the Liberty of all Commonwealths, than Jealousies and Misunderstandings among those who sit at the Helm of Affairs, the Party that is undermost thirsting always after Changes and Innovations. The *Venetians* know well

well enough, that the Ruin of all Commonwealths has proceeded from the Divisions among their principal Citizens. They are aware, how most of the other Republicks in *Italy* have, by their intestine Quarrels, dispeopled their own Cities, and drove out the Inhabitants, according as the different Parties and Factions did prevail. They have seen the fatal Effects of the Divisions between the *Bianchi* and *Neri* in *Florence*. They know what Convulsions and Revolutions the Parties of the *Guelfs* and *Ghibbelines* have occasioned in all the States of *Italy*. Neither are they ignorant of the woful Calamities this Island has formerly been expos'd to, by Factions and Divisions among the Subjects; how those intestine Commotions ended in the Murder of the King, and Subversion of the Government both in Church and State.

The *Venetians* therefore, having learn'd to be wise at the expence of other Nations, take particular care to cultivate a perfect Union among their Nobles, and to suppress immediately all Feuds and Quarrels that happen among them. As soon as any Quarrel arises, the Senate, or Council of Ten, immediately issues out Orders

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to both Parties to make up the breach without delay ; and their Orders are sure to meet with a punctual and ready Compliance, because of the certainty of the Punishment that will fall soon and heavily on the Heads of the Disobedient. All Factions naturally tend to the Destruction of the Persons concern'd in them. And therefore we see that the *Venetians*, when they have a mind to crush and keep under any part of their Subjects, whom they suspect to be any way inclinable to rebel against the State, the Method they take, is to foment Factions and Divisions among them. And this is the very Method which *Father Paul*, in this Discourse, advises them to take with those Subjects whose Fidelity they cannot safely rely on. It is with this View, that the Republick encourages Feuds and Animosities among the Nobility of their conquer'd Provinces, that, being ruin'd by their own Divisions, they may not be in a condition to shake off the Yoke of their Conquerors. It is likewise upon this account, that Parties and Factions are industriously kept on foot among the Citizens of *Venice*, that while they are thus divided among themselves, they may

may never be able to unite in a Revolt against their Superiours. And however Persons may urge, that the entertaining of Parties and Factions tends to preserve the Liberty of the Subject, the different Parties being Checks upon one another; yet it is most certain, that the Experience of past Ages shews us, that Parties and Factions in a State have always ended in the Ruin and Subversion of the Constitution. And wherever Parties have come to any height, either in an Aristocratical Government, or in a Limited Monarchy, they have never fail'd at last to terminate, either in an Absolute Tyranny, or in a Popular Democracy. A Nation that has a mind to preserve its present Constitution of Government, can never be able to do it, without entertaining a perfect Union and Harmony among its Members. And when a People grow weary of their antient Constitution, they cannot fall upon a more effectual way to destroy it, than by setting up Parties and Factions in the State.

Among many other excellent things which are to be met with in the Government of the Republick of *Venice*, I think their manner of enacting new Laws is worthy of Remark. When
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any new Law is to receive the publick Sanction, it is first drawn up into a Form by the Judges, or Magistrates, to whose Jurisdiction the subject matter of the new Law does belong. If the Law that is to be made, concerns the Punishment of any Crime, the Judges of the Criminal Court draw up the Form of the Law. If it has respect to the Administration of Civil Justice, the Draught of the Law is made by the Civil Judges. If it is propos'd to remedy any Extravagance in the Equipage, Apparel, or Diet, of the Nobles, or Subjects, of the Republick; the framing of the new Law is recommended to the Magistrates who are entrusted with putting the Sumptuary Laws in execution. If the Design of the Law is to crush all Cabals and Parties among the Nobles, to prevent their soliciting and making interest for Places of Trust, the new Law is pen'd by the Censors, whose Office it is to have a watchful eye over the Conduct of the Nobles.

When the new Law is once fram'd and drawn up by the proper Magistrates, they carry it first into the College, which is as it were the Privy Council of the Republick, it being compos'd

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compos'd of the Doge, and his fix Counsellors, of the three Presidents of the Criminal Court, and of the sixteen *Sages*, or Ministers of State, of the Republick. There the Magistrates who have drawn up the Law, lay open the Inconveniences and Defects of former Laws relating to that Affair, and shew the Necessity, or Usefulness, of the new Law, to prevent, for the future, the Abuses that are complain'd of. If the Draught of the Law is approv'd of in the College, then the Magistrates who drew it up have Leave to lay it before the Senate, and to satisfy the Senators of the Necessity, or Usefulness, of the said Law. If it passes in the Senate, it acquires the Force of a Law. After which it is promulged to the People, that none may pretend Ignorance; and then every one is bound to observe it, and the Magistrates who had the drawing of it up, are to see it punctually obey'd. Sometimes after a Law has past in the Senate, it is thought fit to have it likewise ratified in the Great Council; but this is not necessary according to the Constitution of the Government of the Republick, the Senate being vested with the Supreme Legislative

gislative Power. However, this depends chiefly on the Will and Pleasure of the Magistrates who have the care of framing the new Law; and they sometimes are induced to lay it before the Great Council, that the new Law may have the greater Credit and Reputation among the People. This Method of enacting Laws, methinks, is suitable to the Wisdom and Prudence that is requir'd in Lawgivers. Here the Laws are not huddled up in the hurry of Publick Affairs; the care of drawing them up is not committed to Persons, who are altogether unacquainted with the subject matter of the new Law, or whose Thoughts are distracted with all the other publick Concerns of the Commonwealth. The Laws of this Republick are maturely weigh'd and consider'd before they are laid before the Senate; and they are fram'd by Persons whose Business it is to be daily conversant in those matters to which the new Law relates; by Persons who are most sensible of the Abuses complain'd of, and who best know the proper ways to remedy them. When Laws are drawn up with this maturity of Counsel and Deliberation,
when

when they are examin'd with this foresight and precaution before they receive the Publick Sanction; this is a most effectual Expedient to prevent all Inconveniences from new Laws, and it is the only way to make the Laws of a State durable and lasting.

As the *Venetians* shew a great deal of Prudence, in the framing of Laws for the Government of their Subjects; so they are no less careful in getting an exact Information of the Laws and Government of other Countries, and of the Interests of all the other States of Christendom. They oblige their Ambassadors, when they return from their Embassies, to give in to the Senate, in writing, a Report of their Embassies, containing an Account of the present State of the Courts where they have resided, with a Character of the several Princes, and of their chief Ministers of State, the Maxims of their Government, the Interest they have to manage with other Princes, and more particularly the Advantages which the Republick may reap by a good Correspondence with those Princes, and the Methods by which they may be most readily influenced to a Compliance

plyance with the Interest of their Commonwealth. These Reports, after they have been publickly read in the Senate, are carefully laid up in the Archives of the Republick, that they may afterwards serve as Instructions to the other Nobles that are sent Ambassadors to those Courts. As the Ambassadors of the Republick have all manner of Advantages to qualify themselves for serving their Country, before they are sent to foreign Courts; so there is likewise great care taken to train up fit Persons to serve as Secretaries to the Embassies. For before they are sent abroad, they are made acquainted with all the Transactions of the Senate, which gives them such an insight into Affairs of State, and such a Knowledge of the Interests of their own Country, that it fits them for making Political Observations in foreign Parts, and for assisting the Ambassadors in the management of the Concerns of the Republick.

I might instance in a great many more Particulars, to shew the Wisdom and Prudence of the Government of *Venice*. But should I here insist any longer on these matters, I should

transgress the usual bounds of a Preface. I shall therefore conclude what I have to say on this Subject at present, with one Remark more. And that is, that altho' the Republick of *Venice* has many excellent Maxims in its Government, worthy of being imitated by other States; yet whoever looks narrowly into its Constitution, will find likewise many Defects and Failings in it. They will see by the History of this Republick, as well as of all other Commonwealths, whether Aristocratical or Democratical, that Arbitrary and Despotical Government is not peculiar to Monarchy, as some would have it. There is no Form of Government whatever, except a Theocracy, that is altogether perfect in every thing; the only difference between all other Forms of Government consists in this, that some of them are attended with fewer Inconveniencies than others. And since it is impossible to have any Human Form of Government absolutely perfect; we must look upon that to be the happiest and best Constitution, that is liable to fewest Inconveniencies. And I dare be bold to say, that
what-

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Whatever Native of this Island travels into Foreign Countries, and makes a diligent Enquiry into the History and Government of other States, will soon be convinced, that the Monarchy of *Great Britain* is the mildest and gentlest Government in the World; since the Constitution secures the Subjects equally against the Arbitrary and Despotical Power of Princes, against the Tyranny and Oppression of the Nobles, and against the Confusion and Disorder of the Populace. If any People upon Earth can be easy and contented in a State of Subjection to Lawful Superiors, the *British* Subjects have most reason so to be; since they live under such an excellent and well-temper'd Constitution of Government, that every Man may sit securely under his own Fig-tree, and peaceably enjoy the Fruit of his Labours. And to make us continue a happy People for ever, I think there is nothing wanting, but the joint Endeavours of all the Subjects, to maintain and preserve our Constitution sacred and inviolable in all its Parts, to be at

Peace and Unity among our selves,
to banish all Parties and Factions,
and to take special care, that the
Liberty which the Subject happily
enjoys, does not degenerate into a li-
centious Impunity of Railing against
God and Man.

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THE

I

Father PAUL's ADVICE

TO THE
Republick of VENICE :

How it ought to govern it
self both inwardly and out-
wardly, in order to perpetuate
its Dominion, &c.

*Most Illustrious, and most Noble
Lords, Inquisitors of State^a.*

IT is purely in obedience to, your I.
Commands that I write this, with-^{The Introdu-}
out reflecting on my own Unfit-^{tion.}
ness for such a Work; because I think
the chief Consideration I ought to have,
B is

^a The Inquisitors of State are three Noble-
men chosen out of the Council of Ten, who are
entrusted with such an absolute and unlimited
Power, that they may condemn the Doge him-
self to be drowned, or strangled, if they all
three are of the same Mind: But if they are
divided in their Opinions, they must communi-
cate the matter to the Council of Ten. They
have

The Maxims of the

is the Obedience I owe my Sovereign, to whom I owe all I have, and to whose Service I have entirely devoted my Labours. So that if the writing of these Papers can contribute any thing to the Service of my Prince, I shall not be wanting either in Willingness to promote it, or in Faithfulness to tell what I think most for his Interest.

II.
*Heads of the
Discourse.*

Your Excellencies are pleas'd to command me, to give my Opinion as to the manner in which the Republick ought to be govern'd, so as that we may have ground to hope for its perpetual Duration. To lead us into the Knowledge of this, it will be necessary to divide our Discourse into three Heads. *First*, we shall set down some Rules to be observ'd in the Go-

have their Spies in all the Corners of the City, and over all the Dominions of the Republick, to give them an account of the Words and Actions of all the Nobles, and Subjects. They go over the Palace of *St. Mark* at all Hours in the Night, where they enter and go out at private back Doors, to which they have a Key. They may go, if they please, even to the Doge's Bed-side, go into his Closet, make open his Scrutore, and take an Inventory of all his Papers; and neither the Doge himself, nor any of his Domesticks, dare seem to take notice of them.

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vernment of the City, together with the proper ways to be used for keeping the Nobility, and Subjects, within the Bounds of their Duty. In the *Second* place, we shall consider the different Methods that are to be used in governing the several Territories belonging to the Republick. And *Thirdly*, we shall examine what Regards the Republick ought to have in its Treaties with other Princes.

CHAP. I.

Rules to be observ'd in the Government of the City, and the proper ways for keeping the Nobility, and Subjects, within the Bounds of their Duty.

IN speaking to this point, I might apply the Saying of St. Bernard ^L *A Saying of St. Bernard's to this purpose.* to the Doge Moro, which was, *That the Republick would last as long as the Custom continued of doing Justice;* a Maxim no less politick than holy, because under this short Rubrick are contain'd so many good Advices, that were they all faithfully observ'd, we

we might justly expect thereby to perpetuate the Dominion of the Commonwealth to all Ages. But to speak more conformably to the Condition of the Times, we must reduce under the Title of Justice, every thing that may contribute to the Service of the State; for the Prince has no greater Justice, than to preserve to himself the Quality of Prince, and in order to this, to keep his Subjects in a dutiful Subjection to his Authority. Some extend the meaning of Justice to every thing that may contribute to the enlargement of the State; but such an extension would be attended with such Accidents, as would rather destroy, than maintain the Quality of Justice. So that to keep within the Bounds of what is at least probable, if not wholly true, we shall continue in this Opinion, that Justice includes every thing that may contribute to the Preservation of the State.

II.
*The Nobility to
be taxed, as
well as the
Subjects.*

In the Government of the City, it is an excellent Custom to tax the Nobility, as well as the Subjects; because the Tax is the less burthenfome, when it is universal; and it is the more just, when it is laid on without partiality. There is no doubt, but the making the Nobility subject to Taxes, lessens their Splendor; and in other Governments,
the

the Noblemen, altho' they are not constituent parts of the Sovereignty, but either Subjects, or Vassals, are exempted from Taxes, and contribute to the Defence of the Publick, more with their Swords, than with their Purfes. However, since this Custom has been born with for many Ages, and because it is not convenient to encourage too much the Privileges of the Sword, it is better to let this Custom go on, than to change it, because such a change would occasion too great Resentment among the common People, and too great Presumption among the Nobles; I mean, those that are such by Character, but who have not the Qualities belonging to that Order, 'Tis true, when Taxes are personal, and admit of Favour, I should advise the exempting every Nobleman that has the least pretence to it. And when the Tax is laid upon *Estates* in such a manner, that it becomes unavoidable, it would be convenient industriously to grant to the Noblemen the Benefit of Time; and even altho' after this Indulgence they should still continue backward in paying, yet it would not be proper to have recourse to the Rigor of the Law, to force them to it. The reason why I advise these tender Methods to be used in levying Taxes on the Nobility,

lity, is, that Noblemens Estates may always be preserv'd entire to the Families. For extreams are always dangerous, and the Commonwealth may suffer as much from too poor a Nobility, as from one that is too rich. Besides, it raises too much of Envy, among a People, when any one sees himself strip'd, and his Companion clad with his Cloaths, because he had not wherewithal to pay a Debt that was laid upon him by the Will of others.

III. Those who do not pry narrowly into the reasons of things, exaggerate, as a great abuse in this Republick, the having Governments of so small an Income; that they force, as it were, the Magistrates, and Governours, to transgress the Rules of good Government, and, after having sat as Judges of others, to submit themselves to Judgment, that they may justify, if they are able, their own Integrity. This is an Abuse that is mightily talk'd of, and truly in appearance it is one; for it being a Duty to afford means of Living to those that have it not, the putting Persons into Governments that have such a poor Revenue, puts them in the way, not to live, but to Plunder. However, I would not advise the augmenting the Profits of these Govern-

The having Governments with a small Income, not so great an Abuse as appears at first sight.

Governments, because there arises from them another much greater Benefit to the Publick, which is the keeping the poorer Nobility always in a low condition, which is like to the Viper, that is not able in the Cold to use its Poison. For otherwise these Nobles, who are discontented in their Minds, could they but rise to any tolerable degree of Fortune in the World, they would set up for Competitors to the Nobility of the first Rank; and, by the Strength of their Number, they would be able to play some mad prank in the State of the Republick. But now they are kept within the Bounds of their Duty, not only by the watchful Eye of the Nobility, who never fail to clip the Wings of those that attempt to soar aloft, but likewise because they are every other Day subject to the Censure of the prime Nobility, for their Misdemeanors in their Government; so that holding of them their Lives, and that little Fortune which they enjoy, they are in reality Subjects, and have only the appearance of Nobles. I am clearly of opinion, that the search into the Mismanagements of their Government ought not to be very rigid, except when the Abuses committed by them are so very excessive as to give Scandal to all the

Subjects; in which case it is necessary to declare an Abhorrence of the Crime by a publick Resentment. But where the Grievances against them are not very crying, it is better to go on gently, and to let the Obligation they are under, to give an account of their Stewardship, suffice for their Punishment.

IV.
*In what manner
the Nobility
ought to be
punish'd.*

I should think it were not very proper to condemn any of the Nobility, altho' never so criminal, to a publick Death; because the Loss which the Order of the Nobility suffers in the Esteem, and Veneration of the Subjects, when any of them are seen to pass thro' the Hands of a Hangman, is greater than the Benefit which is reap'd by a publick Shew of Justice. For never one pretends to be under an Obligation to the Person that does him Justice, because he thinks him bound to do that of his own accord. But on the other hand, I should not like to see those Noblemen, that are so highly criminal, appear in the publick Places of the City; because this would create a bad Opinion of the Government; so that it were better either to let them end their Days in a Prison, or if it be necessary to punish them with Death, to do it privately. If the Absence of these

Government of Venice.

these Criminals make it necessary for the Government to proceed to Outlawry, and Banishment, let that be done with the utmost Severity; for then if no more is done against them, it is believ'd to be because no more can be done. But there ought to be no less Rigour used in receiving them back again into the Republick; because they being of themselves rotten Members, cut off from the Body of the Society, it is not expedient to deform the Body, by patching to it anew those corrupt and putrefied Members.

Here I foresee that some will be apt to accuse me of being a bad Pilot, and that while I strive to avoid *Charybdis*, I strike against *Scylla*; that is, that while I endeavour to keep the inferior Nobility in a low condition, I do not foresee the Danger there is from the greater Nobility; which yet ought to be of greater Consideration, because they are more powerful, both in Wealth and Alliances. I perceive the Objection, but it does not appear to me to be of any Weight; and this proceeds from the long Practice I have of this City, as to which I dare be bold to prophesy, that the Republick of *Venice* will never suffer that Fate which has been the end of all other
Common-

v.

*No fear that
any of the Nobility
of Venice
ever usurp the
Government of
the State.*

The Maxims of the

Commonwealths; that is, that the Authority of many having been reduced into the Hands of a few Persons, and from a few into the Hands of one, all Commonwealths have ended in a Monarchy. The Emulation that is, not only between the Nobles of the first Rank, and those who aspire at being greater, but likewise between the Noblemen of one and the same Family, nay even between Brothers, secures us from this Danger. And if ever it should fall out, which is utterly impossible, that the Brothers of one Family should have it in their power to make a Dictator of the Commonwealth, they would never agree in the Choice of any one of themselves; and they would rather chuse to remain Noblemen of a Republick, where they shar'd the Authority with a hundred others, than be Princes of the Blood Royal, and Brothers to the King.

VI.

Expensive Governments instituted on purpose to drain the Coffers of the rich Nobility.

The Governments of greatest Splendour and Dignity, which are called expensive Governments, and which are left designedly with small Incomes by the Wisdom of our Ancestors, that they may serve as a means to drain the Coffers of the Noblemen, that are too rich, ought to be distributed pursuant to the intention of those who instituted them;

Government of Venice.

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them; that is, to such Persons as have the Means and the Inclination to keep up the Splendour and Dignity of such Employments. For if they are given to such Persons as have not wherewithal to supply the excessive Charges, they will be sure to make the Government it self do it either by fair or foul means; and if they are Persons of a genteel mannerly Education, they'll try to do it rather by sharpening ways, than by downright Extortion and Rapine: and as by this way they get the Hatred, so by the other they lose the Respect of the Subjects. This is a matter of great importance, and whoever administers any such Government fordidly and indecently, deserves very ill at the hands of his Country, because he renders contemptible the Person who represents its Sovereign; and all Rebellions of Subjects have had their first rise from the Contempt of the Prince.

As to the Abuses committed by the Nobility, that are not in any Place of publick Trust. If the Offence is committed by one Nobleman against another that is equal to him in Fortune, provided they have made up the matter between themselves, the Government may wink at it. If the Injury is done by a Nobleman of high rank, to one

VII.

How Abuses committed by the Nobility and the Commonalty, are to be punished.

one of the same Quality that is reduced to Poverty, it is necessary to revenge it with some rigour, lest the neglect of affording him the publick Protection should stir up the bad Humours of all the poor Nobility. If it is a Nobleman of great following that has received the Injury, from a Nobleman of an inferiour Rank, the Offender is to be punish'd severely, lest the injur'd Party seeing himself frustrated of the publick Authority, should attempt to do himself Justice by the force of his Adherents. When the Offence is committed by a Nobleman against a Subject, let all ways be try'd to justify him; and if that is not possible to be done, let him be chastis'd with greater noise than damage. If it is a Subject that has affronted a Nobleman, let him be punish'd with the utmost Severity, that the Subjects may not get too great a Custom of laying their hands on the Patrician Order; and that the Opinion may be preserv'd, as much as is possible, that our Nobility is come of sacred and venerable Blood. The Abuses committed by the Common People, one against another, may be judged in the ordinary way; and here Justice may be administered impartially, there being no political Consideration to hinder it. Nay,
in

in this case it might not be improper to imitate *Cato*, who fomented Discord among the Slaves of his own Family, and to entertain our Commonalty in continual Divisions and Jarrings among themselves; for which end it was, that our Ancestors permitted the little pitch'd Battels among the People^b.

^b The Senate of *Venice* being apprehensive of the Danger that might arise to their Government from too great a Correspondence and Union among the Common People, who would be able, if their Forces were united, to wrest the Power out of the hands of the Nobles, does industriously cherish two Factions in the City; one of which goes by the Name of *Castellans*, and the other of *Nicolots*. There is such an Emulation between these two Factions, that all their study is how to spite and vex one another. And if their Children happen to meet in the Streets, and know one another to be of different Parties, they seldom fail to fight it out at Fifty-cuffs, and the Spectators never offer to part them, till the one has drawn Blood of the other, that he who is vanquish'd may be thereby animated to take his revenge some time or other on his Adversary. The Senate sometimes allows these Parties to try their Strength in pitch'd Battels at Handy-blows, under pretence of giving Diversion to Foreign Princes and Ambassadors, that pass thro' the City; but in reality, that they may keep up the Animosity and Spite that is between the two Factions. The *Nicolots* have a Doge of their own, who is usually some Tradesman, living in that Quarter of the Town which is called *St. Nicholas*.

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VIII.

*Justice to be
impartially ad-
ministred in
the Civil
Courts.*

In the Courts of Civil Judicature, it would be necessary to avoid all manner of Partiality and Passion, and to abolish every thing that may give the least ground to the bad Report that has got abroad, as if Justice were partially administred in favour of a Nobleman, and one that is rich. So that to root out this pernicious Conceit, no Advantage ought to be allow'd in Tryals of Law on the account of Rank; for a poor Man, who sees his Cause decided against him only because of his Poverty, will be apt to banish himself thro' Despair. And with respect to the Administration of Civil Justice, there can never be too much care taken in making it appear to be upright and sincere, this being a very material Foundation of the State. For when the Subject sees that he has Justice impartially done him, when he has Right on his side, he is induced to bear easily with many other Burthens: Whereas on the other hand, when a Man is wrong'd in his Estate, altho' he should be graciously pardon'd for all the Crimes and Offences he has been guilty of against the State, yet he'll never prove a good Subject. For an Injury that is done us is never forgotten; but the Memory of a Favour we have received soon vanishes.

Care

Care must be taken to prevent, as much as we would do the Plague, the People from flocking together in great numbers; because there needs no more for overturning the Commonwealth, than to leave it easy for the People to unite together in any Conference ^a.

IX.

The People not to be allow'd to assemble in great Multitudes.

Nay, this assembling together in great Multitudes is so dangerous to the State, that it is necessary to shew a Detestation and Abhorrence of it, even among the Noblemen. For as in every Human Body there are many corrupt Humours, which if separated, and kept asunder, either do no harm, or are easily cured; but if they begin to move, and unite together, they become stubborn, and sometimes mortal. It is exactly the same with the Body Politick, as with the Human Body. A watchful Eye must be kept over all dissatisfied Persons, on those that are

^a It is in conformity to this Advice, that the Venetians do not allow of any Coffee-houses in their City, that are able to contain great numbers of People. Their Coffee-houses are generally little Shops, that will not hold above five or six Persons at a time, and perhaps there are not Seats for above two or three. So that the Company having no where to rest themselves, are gone as soon as they have made an end of drinking their Coffee.

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inclin'd to Sedition, or Men of great Speculation, particularly when they presume to censure the Government. A Stop must be put to the growth of Heresy, which at first was introduced in no other manner, than by way of pleasant Wit, and Curiosity.

X.

The Arsenal to be kept always in good condition.

The Arsenal ought always to be kept in a good condition; and altho' there be no pressing Occasion for fitting out a Fleet, yet it is convenient that our Governours consider, and have it always in their minds, that a Prince may destroy in one Day thousands of Men, but that it is not in the power of Mankind to make so much as one Man be born, or conceived, in an instant; so that as to those things which depend on Time, it is necessary to anticipate them with Time. The Artisans belonging to the Arsenal are to be kept easy and contented; and no Charges ought to be spar'd in a thing on which depends the universal Welfare. When any of these Workmen are found guilty of a Fault, they ought to be chastis'd as a Father chastises his Son, that is, with an appearance of Rigour, but still with so much Gentleness, as that he be not quite frighten'd from the House.

The

The Secretaries^d of the Republick,
and all other Persons that are let into
the knowledge of the publick Interests,
The Secretaries to be chosen with great care, and not rashly turn'd out.

^d The Secretaries belonging to the Republick are divided into three Classes. The first in Rank and Dignity consists of those who are Secretaries to the Council of Ten. They are four in number; and their Office is in great esteem, because of the great Jurisdiction of the Tribunal to which they belong. The second Class contains the Secretaries to the Senate, who are in all twenty four; and of these there are five or six always imployed as Residents in Naples, Milan, Florence, Swisserland, &c. having an allowance of two thousand Ducats a Year. Of this number likewise there are always five or six imployed as Secretaries to the Embassies, which the Republick sends to foreign Courts; where the Senate obliges their Secretaries to reside for some Years, that they may have time to inform themselves thoroughly of the Government and Interests of those Countries, and be able to give the necessary Instructions to the Ambassadors that are sent thither. So that the Secretaries are not usually recalled from the Courts to which they are sent, till they have served under two or three Ambassadors. These are the Secretaries who assist in the College at the Audiences given to the Ambassadors of Princes, that they may make Report to the College in a few words, of the Proposals, or Demands, made by these Ambassadors. They carry the Senate's Answer to the Ambassadors, which they first read in the Ambassador's Presence, and afterwards indite to his Secretary, they bringing back their own Copy with them, which they are required not to part with on pain of Death.

The Secretaries of these two Classes are let
into

ought to be Men of able Parts, and zealous for the publick Good; but if they chance to be Men of weak Abili-

into the knowledge of all the publick Transactions, it being their Office to read in the College, and in the Senate, all the Letters that are sent to the Republick, and to draw up those which the Senate sends to Princes. These Secretaries have each of them a Sallary of 400 Ducats a Year, besides considerable Perquisites and Privileges annex'd to their Office.

The Secretaries of the third Class are not fix'd to any certain number, and their Office is almost like to that of Clerks, or Registers, in Courts of Justice. For they write the Sentences that are pronounced in the Courts of Justice that sit in the Palace of *St. Mark*, and in the *Rialto*, and give them out to the Parties. They likewise draw up Contracts of Marriage, Testaments, and other Deeds belonging to Notaries. So that, properly speaking, they are only Publick Notaries, or Registers, and are not admitted into the knowledge of the Affairs of State. However, they rise gradually from this lower Class to the other two, which are more considerable.

These three Orders of Secretaries depend wholly on the Council of Ten, who has the election of them; and if any of them fail in their Duty, they are accountable to this dreadful Tribunal. It is out of this College of Secretaries, that the Chancellor of the Republick is always chosen, who is the Head, or Doge, as it were, of all the Citizens that are not noble. His Office is both honourable and profitable. His Sallary is three thousand Ducats a Year, and the Perquisites of his Place amount yearly to about nine or ten thousand Ducats, and he is not oblig'd to be at any expence. Altho' he is not Noble, yet he has all the Privileges of the Nobility, and some that are peculiar to his Office.

ties,

ties, yet they are to be born with. It is fit to examine well into their Qualifications before they are receiv'd into the Office, but when they are once admitted, they ought to be kept in, such as they are. For there are but few Persons capable of doing good, and every one is able to do mischief; and it is much easier to guard our selves against the Snares of a powerful Enemy without doors, than of a wicked Servant that lives in the Family.

Let the Arts that are peculiar to the City be carefully preserv'd, and in order to that, they ought not to be overcharg'd with great Burthens. For *Gain*, which has been able to persuade Men to go in search of new Worlds, with the hazard of their Lives, if it is not found by the Merchant in the place where he expects it, he'll go in quest of it elsewhere, even to the *Antipodes*. The Crafts-men belonging to these Arts ought to be encouraged to remain in their Country, and not to travel abroad*. For an Art is only an ima-

XII.

*Arts peculiar
to the City to
be encouraged*

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ginary

* It is in observance of this Maxim, that the *Venetians* have thought fit to confer such distinguishing Marks of their Favour on the Glass-workers of *Muran*. The Senate being sensible of the great Profit the Republick made by their Manufacture of Glass, to encourage the Tradesmen belonging to that Art to remain among them,

ginary Being, which has its Existence no where but in the Brain of the Artificer, who is Master both of the Speculation and Practice. And if the Art once become common to many places, it loses the half of its advantage, which consists in being useful to our selves, and helpful to others.

XIII.
Marriages between the Nobility and Plebeians sometimes convenient.

Marriages between the Nobility, and Women of an inferiour Rank, may be tolerated, especially when the Women carry great Portions along with them; for by this means it often happens, that the Labours and Toils of many Plebeians for several Ages, go to enrich one Noble Family. And this is a pleasant kind of Partition, which altho' it may eclipse the Splendour of the Nobility in some measure, yet that is only in things meerly superficial; but in things that are more substantial, it adds to the greatness of the Order, and fortifies it. Nor is it to be fear'd, that the Offspring of such Marriages will prove low and mean spirited; for there is nothing debases the Spirit more than Poverty. Besides, we are to consider

them, they made them all Burgesses of Venice, and allowed the Nobles to marry their Daughters without degrading from their Nobility. Whereas if a Nobleman marry the Daughter of any other Tradesman, the Children of that Marriage are not reputed Noble.

sider the great Advantage that accrues to the Nobility by bringing, by this means, the Commonalty to be cordially in their interest, who are bound, by this soft and agreeable Chain, to support and maintain the Authority of the Nobles.

The great Honours of the Country ought to be distributed, as much as can be, among the ancient Nobility, except when any of the new Pretenders have some extraordinary personal Merit, in which case all Prodigality becomes a Virtue. But otherwise to confer great Honours on Persons that are not able to count to the third or fourth Generation, would be to give occasion of Wonder to the Subjects, and of Envy to the Nobles. It would likewise encourage the most abject among the Nobility to pretend to high Preferments, and they not finding themselves advanced to any higher condition than what their indifferent Parts deserve, would not be able to satisfy themselves why such a one should have attain'd to great Preferment, and they remain excluded. Besides, to feed a Stomach, that has always been accusom'd to a slender Diet, with high season'd Meats, such as are serv'd up to the Table of a Prince, would be the ready way to make it fall sick for want of digestion.

XIV.

The great Honours to be distributed among the ancient Nobility.

Then the Subjects are not easily prevail'd with to shew an extraordinary Respect for one, for whom they have been accusom'd to have but a slender regard; and they are apt to fancy, that the Dignity is not very considerable, when it is confer'd on a Person of no great note.

XV.
Republicks defective in having too great numbers in their Councils.

And because all sublunary Bodies are liable to Corruption, and Commonwealths more than others, they being Bodies made up of many Individuals, so that the Defect increases with the number of the Members; I must therefore beg leave to speak my Mind freely in this point, without which I cannot well perform the Service you require of me. My Opinion therefore is, that the Republick of *Venice* is obnoxious to this Fatality, from which no other Commonwealth has ever been exempted; and if any Person has pretended to give us an Idea of a Commonwealth without Blemish, it has been no more than a bare Fiction, that never was reduced to Practice. The Defect of our Republick is in being too numerous^f, in order to preserve

^f The number of the *Venetian* Nobility in former Days was very great, having amounted to about four thousand and five hundred; but many Families being extinct, they do not now exceed

preserve its Aristocratical Form. So that it would be convenient to procure, with all manner of Industry, the Great Council to delegate a great Share of its

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exceed two thousand, notwithstanding of the additional Families that have been aggregated to their Nobility at different times. Formerly there have been about fifteen or sixteen hundred Noblemen assembled in the Great Council, but now they seldom exceed eight or nine hundred. When the Great Council is assembled about the Election of Magistrates, they do not much mind what number of Noblemen meet together. But when the Council is called to make new Laws, or to consider of any Business of great Importance, it is requisite that there be present in the Council at least six hundred Noblemen. The Great Council being therefore such a numerous Assembly, and it being impossible, for that reason, to avoid Confusion in their Proceedings, since all the Noblemen that are past five and twenty Years of Age have a Right to sit in it; *Father Paul* is for having all Business, except that of the Creation of Magistrates, taken out of the Hands of the Great Council, and carried before the Senate, or Council of Ten. The Senate consists of about three hundred Nobles; many of which, altho' they are entitled by their Offices to be present at the Deliberations of the Senate; yet they have no right to vote. And of those that have a right to vote, there are not above six and twenty that are allowed to make any new Proposal to the Senate. And these are the Doge and his six Counsellors, the three Presidents of the Council of Forty for Criminal Affairs, and the sixteen *Sages*, who are, as it were, the chief Ministers of State to the Republick, they having all the publick Affairs con-

ton'd

Authority to the Senate, and to the Council of Ten; but in such a hidden and secret manner, as that it may not be discover'd, till after it is done. For
since

would out among them into so many Provinces. The five Sages who are called *Savii di Mare*, or *Savii degli Ordini*, have the Inspection over all the Naval Affairs. The five *Savii di Terra Ferma* take care of all the Affairs that concern the Territories which the Republick has on the Continent. The six *Savii Grandi*, who are the chief of all the Sages, have a transcendent Authority over all those Affairs, whether they concern Sea or Land. And besides, they have a particular Power to prescribe and direct in every thing that relates to Peace or War; to draw up the Letters which the Republick sends to Princes; and, in a word, to give Counsel and Advice in every thing that concerns the Republick. The other Senators are only to approve or disapprove of whatever is proposed by those Persons that are authorized to make Overtures to the Senate; and if any Senator thinks of any Expedient that may be more proper than what has been already offer'd, he must get one of them to make the Proposal to the Senate. The reason of this Order, is to prevent all manner of Confusion in the Deliberations of this Assembly, which could not well be avoided, if all the Senators were left at liberty to propose in the Senate whatever appear'd to them to be expedient. Besides, it is not very likely that any thing that is truly expedient, and useful to the Republick, should be altogether omitted by those six and twenty Persons who are authorized to make the Overtures; or if it is omitted by them, the Senator who thinks of the Expedient, may convince one of those six and twenty Persons of the

since it has already divested it self of some Branches of its Power, and since we see that this has had wonderful Success in the *Deliberative* part of the Government; so likewise if it resign'd its Right as to the *Judiciary* and *Distributive* parts of the Administration, we might hope thereby to see the Constitution of the Republick much mended. It cannot be denied, but the Great Council favours a little of the Mob, and that it is, for this reason, subject to impetuous Deliberations, and that the Affairs which are laid before it, are not always so maturely weigh'd and consider'd, as Matters of that Importance deserve. And truly I stand amazed, when I consider that our Ancestors, who were Men of great Judgment, and zealous for the publick Good, did not take the Advantage of the Simplicity of the Times in which they liv'd, and make one Step farther towards reforming our Constitution: if not in any other thing, at least in continuing the Senators longer in their Of-

the Usefulness of it, and get him to propose it to the Senate. It happens by this means, that Matters are transacted in the Senate with a great deal of Gravity and Sedateness, and notwithstanding the great Numbers of that Assembly, with a Secrecy that is altogether surprizing, and perhaps peculiar to the *Venetian* Councils.

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fice than from Year to Year, without a new Confirmation from the Great Council. For as the Practice of obliging the Senators to be confirmed every Year anew, seems to guard us, on the one hand, against the Tyranny of the Grandees; so it exposes us, on the other hand, to the Tyranny of the lower Nobility, which is so much the more odious, because they are more in number, and have less Experience in publick Affairs. We should see much more Vigour in the Resolutions of our Senators, if they were not bound to cringe perpetually to the other Nobles, for their Vote to continue them in the Senate from Year to Year.

XVI.

Great Caution
to be used in the
choice of Avogadors.

The Office of *Avogador** ought to

* The *Avogadors* are three in number; and their Office is much like that of our Attorney-General, but their Power is of a much larger extent. They are not only the Prosecutors of Criminals, but they are also the Guardians of the Laws; they are to take care that they be strictly observed by Persons of all Ranks, and that the Magistrates do their Duty in administering Justice in their several Stations. They have Power to carry the Criminal Causes either before the Council of Forty appointed for Criminal Matters, before the Senate, or before the Great Council, according as they judge the Cause to be of greater or less Importance. The Senate, and Great Council cannot assemble, unless there is one *Avogador* present, otherwise their Deliberations are of no force.

be

be disposed of with great Caution, and given to Persons of the greatest Rank. For if the Persons who are put into this Office be of a noble and high Spirit, such as scorn to creep and crouch to the multitude of the great Council; the Senate, and Council of Ten might venture upon many Deliberations, as occasion requires, which, altho' they exceeded their ordinary Authority, would nevertheless be thought fit to be born with, and Time would authorize their meddling in such matters without the Concurrence of the Council. But should an *Avogador*, in order to make himself popular, carry every thing of this kind before the Council; they, out of Jealousie lest their Authority should be encroach'd upon, would certainly annul every thing that the Senate had decreed, let it be never so expedient. If it happen that the Office of *Avogador* is not conferr'd on such Persons as are more inclin'd to support the Dignity of the Senate, than to make themselves popular among the lower Nobility; it is fit, at least, to pitch upon such Persons, as are either of a low mean Spirit; or if they are of brisk lively Parts, let them be such whose Reputation is not altogether entire, but blemish'd with the Imputation of Sordidness; that if they
are

are Persons of weak Parts, they may not be able, and if they have good Talents, and a bad Reputation, they may not dare to enter the Lists with the Senators. For otherwise an *Avogador* that has Parts, Integrity and Malice, may easily set fire to the four Corners of the Republick.

XVII.
The Councils of
Forty inconve-
nient to the
State.

For these and such like Reasons it would be convenient to diminish the Authority of the Councils of Forty^b, because they are Assemblies that are too

^b There are three Councils of Forty; one of which is called *Quarantia Criminale*, it being appointed for the Trial of all Criminal Causes. The other two are for Civil Causes; one of them has the Name of *Quarantia Civile Vecchia*, and has Cognizance of all Appeals from the Sentences of all the Courts of Justice within the City of Venice. The other is called *Quarantia Civile Nuova*, and to this Court there lies an Appeal from the Sentences of all the Judges in the Territories belonging to the Republick without the City. The Judges of these three Courts mount gradually from one Court to the other. They are first chose into the *Quarantia Civile Nuova*, as being the Court of least Esteem, where they sit Judges for eight Months; then they are translated to the *Quarantia Civile Vecchia*, where they sit other eight Months; and at last they mount to the *Quarantia Criminale*, where they officiate likewise eight Months; and then their Office of Judicature expires. But after an Interval of eight Months, they are capable of being chosen anew into the *Quarantia Civile Nuova*.

popular,

popular, instituted with so great Numbers, on purpose to avoid the Danger of exposing Justice to Sale; but at the same time they bring us under another great Inconvenience, in assembling together so many bad and corrupt Humours, and thereby endangering our Constitution. And as the Physitian to the Body deserves to be excused, if to heal the Liver he offends the Stomach; so it is likewise the best Method the State Physitian can take with the Commonwealth. In the Council of Forty appointed for Civil Affairs, their Authority may be born with; but in the Council of Forty for Criminal Matters, it will be convenient always to lessen it; and this may be done, if the Council of Ten assume to themselves the Judgment of every Cause that has but the least appearance of belonging to their Cognizance; and if the Senate, and great Council abstain wholly from delegating any Causes to this Council of Forty, as they use often to do. I should think it well for the Republick, if these Councils of Forty were totally abolish'd; but at the same time I should think it absolutely necessary, that a Maintenance were provided some other way, for such a number of idle and indigent Nobles, as are employed in these Councils.

cils. But as matters stand at present, I should look upon it as a great piece of Service done to the Country, if every Family of the ancient and rich Nobility did always appoint one of the Brothers to be employed in these Councils of Forty, that they might hinder the poor Nobility from getting into them in so great numbers, which would be a way to keep them more easily under. And all imaginable Care ought to be taken to find out some specious Pretext, for taking away from the inferior Nobility the power of judging the Nobles in Criminal Matters; and this would be a means to make them lose, in a great measure, their Privilege of Nobility. I should be very well pleas'd likewise to see them excluded from the Senate; but this is a thing more to be desired, than expected.

XVIII.

Care must be taken to have all Provisions in plenty.

The common People must always be provided with plenty of those things that are necessary for Food and Raiment, and at as cheap a rate as may be. For the Nature of the Mob is such, that altho' a Dearth is occasion'd by a bad Harvest, yet they always impute it to the Avarice of the Nobility; so that whoever would make them hold their peace, must always stop their Mouths.

It

It will be proper to employ as great a number of the common People as is possible in the Service of the Publick; that they getting their Bread from the Publick, may be well affected to the Government; and that there may be fewer Persons expos'd to die of Hunger. For if Hunger forces impregnable Fortresses to surrender, it will likewise make People expose their Lives to any manner of Hazard, rather than lose them. I would advise however now and then the employing of such Persons, as have whereupon to live tolerably well; for otherwise to employ a Man, and not to afford him Means to live handsomly, is to give him as it it were a just occasion of stealing.

XIX.

As many of the poor People to be employed in the Service of the Publick as is possible.

Let the Women be kept chaste, and in order to that, let them live retir'd from the World; it being certain that all open Lewdness has had its first rise from a Salutation, from a Smile.

XX.

The Women to live in Retirement.

Care must be taken to repress the Abuse that is lately crept in among us, by Noblemen's taking upon them to be Judges of private Differences between Man and Man, and forcing the Subjects to make Peace, to pay Debts, to contract Marriages, and to desist from prosecuting their Rights in the ordinary Courts of Justice.

XXI.

The Noblemen not to be suffer'd to interpose themselves magisterially in private Differences.

For

For this is the greatest Tyranny that the Subject can be liable to, and is able to produce another *Sicilian Vespers*, and not unlikely to set the Noblemen themselves together by the Ears, in the defence of their several Clients.

XXII.

*The Publick
Faith to be ob-
serv'd inviola-
bly.*

On all Occasions that the Publick Faith is engaged, it is necessary to observe it inviolably, without being amus'd by any Profit that may accrue to the Republick by the breach of it. And it is fit to consider, that the Benefit reap'd by breaking it, is momentary; but the Damage that follows upon the not observing it, is perpetual. For a Prince that once breaks his Word, if he will have himself to be believ'd afterwards in what he says, it is necessary that he invent a new Religion, that may be able to tie him, since his first Obligation had not force enough to bind him. If a private Person, who makes no Conscience of keeping his Promise, renders himself thereby incapable of receiving any Supply from others, so that People will hardly trust him even when he goes with ready Money in his Hand; how much less Credit will a Prince find, after Breach of Promise, who is not subject to any Magistrate, that can compel him to pay what he owes;

owes; and who is bound by no other Law than his own Will and Pleasure?

The Nobility must abstain from merchandizing, it being the only way to engage Merchants to settle in the City; for if the Noblemen trade, the Merchants will be afraid of being cheated, and over-awed in their Business. The *Spaniards*, who bear no good Will to the *Venetians*, have not a more odious Title to give *Venice*, than by calling it a Republick of Merchants. By the ancient Law, a Nobleman, whose Blood was tainted with Merchandize, could not enter into the Turnament, as not being reputed an equal to Gentlemen. Trade may in a short time either excessively enrich, or extremely impoverish a Family, and neither the one, nor the other is expedient in a Commonwealth. The Merchant is of necessity a Foreigner, he having Commerce, and Interest in other Nations; whereas a Nobleman ought to have his Affections no where but in his own Country. If the Politicians tell us, that it is not for the good of a City, to have too sumptuous Buildings in the Country about it; because if an Enemy happen to besiege the City, the Citizens, for fear of seeing their Country Seats ruin'd,

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will

XXIII.

The Nobility
ought not to
trade.

will be easily induced to deliver up the Town: What then shall we say of those Noblemen, that by trading may have many hundreds, nay thousands of Crowns in foreign Countries, and very often in Countries that are at War with the Republick? Besides, whoever brings new Commodities into a City, brings along with them at the same time new Customs. In the beginning of the Republick, trading was necessary to redeem it from Poverty, but now it is become suspected as a Fomenter of too great Riches. Milk, which is good Food for a Child, is not so proper for a Stomach that can bear with a stronger Diet. Cities likewise have their own Periods; what is fit for them in their Infancy, is not proper in a riper Age. The *Genoeses*, who retain this Custom of Trading, are but little respected among other Princes; they are more regarded one by one, than all in a Body together.

XXIV.
*All excessive
Pomp to be
banish'd.*

Let all excessive Pomp be banish'd. If this Magnificence in Apparel and Equipage were practis'd only by the rich, it might be profitable to the Commonwealth; because it would be a means of evacuating the Blood of those that are of too sanguine a Complexion; but the Emulation that runs among the Citizens to out-do one another, would make

make many Families ruine themselves, to keep up the same Grandeur with others. If this Distinction could be introduced, it would be a continual Purge for the bad Humours of the State; but there being no possibility of bringing it about, it is the same thing as if one should take every day Physick instead of Food, which would soon put an end to the Distemper, and to the Life of the Patient at the same time. Whoever is under a necessity of doing what he cannot, to enable himself to do it, he will use means that are not lawful. It is said, that Gold is a trial of the Chastity of Women; in this case it would be a Temptation both to Women and Men, not only as to their Honour, but likewise their Justice, and Fidelity.

Before a Law is made, it is fit to consider well of it, and not to be over-hasty in passing it; but when once it is enacted, great care ought to be taken to see it punctually obey'd; for whosoever suffers Disobedience in lesser things, reaches the Practice of it in matters of greater Moment. A Nobleman that places his Greatness in shewing a Disobedience to the Laws, does more Injury to his Country, and to himself, by this bad Example, than by all his other Dissoluteness what-

ever; because he thereby impugns directly the publick Authority. In a Monarchical Government this Abuse may be more easily redress'd, than in a Commonwealth; because if the succeeding Monarch shews but a resoluteness of Mind to have the Laws punctually observ'd, this alone is enough to teach the Subjects Obedience. But a Commonwealth, which is always the same, can never persuade People of this difference of Temper in its Governours, as there is in the Successors to a Crown; and to root out of a Commonwealth any Abuse that has grown old among the Nobility, would cost at least the Lives of half the Citizens.

XXVI.

When any thing is resolv'd on that is against the Inclinations of the People, it will be fit to make them believe, that it was carried only by a small Majority.

If it happen, that any Resolution is taken by the Government, which may seem to be unacceptable to the People, especially in matters of Judgment, it will be convenient to give it out, that this was carried by a small Majority of Voices; that if the People have no other Satisfaction, they may at least have this, of flattering themselves with having had many Persons of the same Sentiment with them.

XXVII.

Secrecy to be enjoined on the Nobility.

Let the Secret of the Republick be kept inviolably: And it is fit that our Nobility always remember the great Vogue

Vogue the *Venetian* Prudence was in, upon the Condemnation of *Carmignola*, whose Sentence was kept secret for eight whole Months, notwithstanding it was pronounced in Presence of three hundred Judges; a thing which absolute Princes are not able to find in the Fidelity of only three or four Ministers, altho' excessively loaded by them with Benefits. It was a matter of no less Astonishment, when the Doge *Foscari* was deposed, to see that his Condemnation was conceal'd from him even by his own Brother. It cannot but be a great Affliction to all that wish well to their Country, to see so excellent a Quality, as this of Secrecy, and so peculiar to our Republick, diminish'd, in some measure, by the inconsiderateness of our Youth; who altho' they have no bad Design in what they do, yet out of a heedlessness, and too great freedom of Temper, blab out things of the greatest Importance. It would be necessary that every Father of a Noble Family, at the same time that he instructs his Children in the Christian Religion, should teach them likewise the use of Secrecy. And to avoid the Danger of losing it, it ought not to be allowed to any Persons whatever, not even to the Noblemen that

assist in Council, to discourse of the publick Transactions, out of the Council Chamber.

XXVIII.

*Honours to be
dispensed gra-
dually.*

The Honours of the Country ought to be dispensed gradually, and all Flights of this kind are to be avoided as being highly pernicious. To see a Cloud all of a sudden cover'd over with Light, is a certain sign of approaching Thunder. It favours too much of the Comedian, for a private Man to be transform'd in an instant into a Prince. When Honours are distributed gradually, it hinders young People from getting at them too soon. And it is certain, that as a Physitian of indifferent Learning, but of long Experience, is to be preferr'd to one that has a great deal of Reading, but little or no Practice; so for governing the Republick, it is better to make use of Persons that have been often employed in Business, altho' they are not Men of the quickest Parts.

XXIX.

Appeals in Causes relating to Church Benefices ought to be carried before the Senate.

It is very proper to have the Causes relating to Church Benefices tried in the Courts at *Venice*, but at the same time it would be very convenient to have the Appeals in such Causes carried before the Senate, and not before the Council of Forty, because it oftentimes happens that such Causes are to be decided by Reasons of State, of which

which the Judges of this Court are either altogether ignorant, or very careless. Besides, it argues no great Harmony in the Subordination of our Courts, that a Sentence pronounced in Presence of the Doge and his Council, should be liable to be censur'd by the Council of Forty, a Court of so little Esteem. If care were taken to reprimand severely, but secretly, the Parties concern'd in those Appeals, or their Advocates, perhaps the Custom of carrying them before the Senate, might in time come to have the force of a Law. If it should happen, that any one procured for himself a Decision in the *Ruota*ⁱ at *Rome*, it would be necessary to command him under a severe Penalty to renounce what he

ⁱ The *Ruota* is a Court of Justice established at *Rome*, consisting of twelve Prelates, whereof one is a *German*, one a Native of *France*, two *Spaniards*, and the other eight are *Italians*; one a *Venetian*, one from *Bologna*, one from *Ferrara*, one out of *Toscany*, one out of the *Dutchy of Milan*, and three *Romans*. Their Jurisdiction extends to all Causes relating to Church Benefices, in all Roman Catholick Countries whatever. And likewise Civil Causes in the City of *Rome*, and within the Territories of the Church, are brought before this Court by way of Appeal. Sometimes Roman Catholick Princes do, by mutual Consent, refer their Differences to the Arbitration of this Court.

had obtain'd in his Favour. Because otherwise all these Causes would be carried to *Rome*, where all Pensions laid upon Benefices are held as sacred, and by this means, the Republick would lose a fourth part of its Judiciary Power in Civil Matters. There is no great harm, if the Auditor of the *Ruota* for the Republick is left as a Bishop *in partibus*, having an empty Title, without any Subjects.

XXX.

The Bishops of the State ought always to be preconis'd in Consistory by a Venerian Cardinal.

The Bishops of the State of the Republick ought always to be preconis'd in Consistory by a *Venetian Cardinal*^k, but without the Circumstance of

^k The Republick of *Venice* being desirous to maintain to it self an equal Rank in all things with Kings, is jealous of the least Favour that is granted to Crown'd Heads, which the Republick does not likewise enjoy. The Emperor, and the other Crowns of the Romish Religion, when they dispose of any Bishopricks within their Dominions, they have them preconis'd in the Consistory at *Rome* by a Cardinal of their own Nation, or by some other Cardinal whom the Princes depute for that end. The Republick of *Venice*, that it may not be in any thing distinguish'd from Kings, insists on the same Right. It is also upon this account, that the Republick has so earnestly, and so long solicited the Court of *Rome*, to grant them a Power to nominate one of their Subjects to a Cardinal's Cap, when the Pope makes his Promotion of Cardinals for the Crowns. They demand likewise that the Nuncio who is sent to their

of creating him Procurator for the Republick; because he would not take the Name of Procurator, but that of Protector, as those for the Crowns have done very improperly. And if any such Deputation were once made, perhaps the Court of *Rome* might desist from creating any *Venetians* Cardinals, on purpose to oblige the Republick to have recourse to a Cardinal of another Nation; which in time might be some Prejudice to the Rank which the Republick holds among the Crown'd Heads. If the Preconisation is made by any other Cardinal than a *Venetian*, it were fit to deny the Person preconised the temporal Possession of his Bishoprick, and to declare his Election, and any Pension laid upon the Bishoprick, to be null and void. It is true, that when the Preconisation is made by the Cardinal Nephew, who has the Character of a Noble *Venetian*, it ought not to be refused, altho' he be not a *Venetian* by Extraction.

their Republick, may be immediately advanced from his Nunciature to the Cardinalship, without being sent Nuncio to any other Court; because this Honour is paid to the Nunciatures of the Empire, *France* and *Spain*. But none of these Requests have they been able hitherto to obtain.

XXXI.
The Republick
ought to strive
to obtain from
the Popes, all
the Titles and
Prerogatives
which they
give to Crown'd
Heads.

If ever it should happen, that one is raised to the Papacy, I shall not say one that is a *Venetian* born, because this would only make a noise, and be of no great advantage, nay on the contrary, occasion considerable damage to the Republick; but one that is of another Country, and well affected to the Republick, it would be convenient to get him to grant to the Republick for ever the Tithes of the Clergy, as it was formerly under *Clement* the VI. the Bull of which is unhappily lost. And this would free the Republick from the Obligation of asking this Favour every five, or every seven Years. It would be very proper likewise to lay hold of such a favourable Opportunity, for getting this addition to be made to the other Prerogatives, which the Republick already enjoys; that the Pope, in the Title which he gives to the Doge, should use the superlative Degree, and call him *most affectionate*, or *most beloved*, as he does Kings. This would be a great Ornament to the Republick, which for want of these things newly mention'd, and likewise because none of the Nuncio's, during their Residence at *Venice*, are ever promoted to the Cardinalship, passes at *Rome* for a middle sort of State between

tween Kings and Dukes. If these things could be obtain'd from a Pope that is well inclin'd to the Republick, it might not be amiss to return the Favour, by making a Law that Ecclesiasticks should not be judged in Criminal Matters, except by the Council of Ten, or by Persons delegated by the said Council.

Having occasion here to speak of the Authority of the Council of Ten¹ XXXII.
 I would *The Orders of the Council of Ten to be strictly obey'd.*

* The *Council of Ten* was at first only a temporary Court of Justice, erected on purpose to make enquiry into the famous Conspiracy of *Baiamont Tiepolo* against the State, when the Government of the Republick was changed into the form in which it is at present, and many Families excluded from the Government, who before this Change were equal Sharers in the Administration with the others. But afterwards this Council was establish'd to be perpetual, to avoid the giving any disgust to the Common People, who never fail'd to murnour at the renewing of this dreadful Tribunal. For many Years after the establishment of this Council, its Authority was confin'd within narrow bounds, because the *Council of Forty for Criminal Matters*, which is of a much antienter date, judg'd of all Crimes, and of many other Affairs. But the Council of Ten, by their Cunning, enlarged their Authority by little and little, so as to assume to themselves the cognizance of all Crimes against the State, of Seditions, of the Misdemeanour of Magistrates, of false Coiners, of the Assassination of Nobles, of Sodomy, of Sacrilege, and sometimes even of Heresy,

I would recommend a strict Observance of the Orders of the said Council. And if there are any of its Orders, that, because of the change of Times,

Heresy. Nay, they have upon some Occasions extended their Power so far, as to repeal and annul the Decrees of the Great Council, and to conclude Leagues, Offensive and Defensive, without the participation of the Senate. But this they did only in certain critical Junctures, where Secrecy was of the highest importance, and where there was no time left for Deliberation. However, at present the Jurisdiction of this Council is limited wholly to Criminal Affairs, in which it judges sovereignly without Appeal. It is so severe and rigorous in its Proceedings, that the very Name of this Tribunal makes all the Nobility tremble for fear; and they have try'd all possible means to get it abolish'd. But all in vain, this Tribunal being look'd upon to be the Corner-stone of the Government, which cannot be removed without overturning the whole Foundation of the State. It is the Dread of this Tribunal alone that is capable to keep the Nobles within the bounds of their Duty. And it is firmly believ'd at *Venice*, that if ever the Council of Ten is abolish'd, Party and Faction, Discord and Sedition, will so prevail in the Republick, as to bring it soon to Ruin.

The ten Judges that sit in this Council ought to be of ten different Families, and to have no near Relation one to another, lest they should abuse the Power that is put into their hands. For if two or three Nobles, nearly related to one another, were capable to sit in this Council at the same time, they might have it in their power to do a great deal of mischief to
the

Times, are become difficult to be put in execution, it were better for the Council to take them anew under their consideration, and to alter in them what is inconvenient, rather than to suffer them to come into disuse by the arrogance of private Persons. But when once any thing is decreed by the Council, it would be necessary to require, under the severest Penalties, a blind and implicit Obedience to be paid to it. And this would procure great Respect to the Council, which, being intrusted with

the Publick; whereas ten Persons, all of different Families, having different Views and Interests, will not so readily unite together in any Design against the State. Besides the ten ordinary Judges, the Doge and his six Counsellors assist always at this Council. The Members of this Council at first enjoyed this Dignity only for a short time, but now they continue one Year in their Office, and after an Interval of two Years they are capable of being chosen again. This Council has in the Palace of *St. Mark* a little Arsenal, wherein there are Arms for fifteen hundred Nobles, in case any Tumult should happen in the City, while the Great Council is assembled. This Council of Ten has a certain number of Gallies belonging to it which are mark'd with these two Letters, C and X; that it may be known that they are solely at the disposal of this Council, and that no other Magistrate can command them. This Council has likewise a certain Sum of the Publick Money deposited in their hands, which they may dispose of as they please, without being liable to give an account.

the

the Exercise of the Regal Power, receives too great Affronts, by having its Orders so frequently, and so openly transgress'd. For that Government is in great danger, which has not, or is not willing to have, a Magistrate whom the Subjects are to obey without controul. And because all Licentiousness has its rise among the Nobility, it would be better to allow them the use of sharp Weapons in the publick Streets, and to forbid them severely to carry any Fire-arms about them, which may occasion some great Inconvenience. But this Custom of wearing sharp Weapons being already crept into use, and commonly practis'd by the Mob; the Noblemen, who pretend to distinguish themselves from the Vulgar, usually carry Pocket-pistols about them. So that the only way to keep the Nobility in order, is to abolish intirely the Liberty usurp'd by the Common People, and to give leave to none to carry Arms upon any pretext whatsoever, there being now no occasion of appointing Guards for the Members of the Council of Ten, or for others, who obtain them under pretext of their being Ministers; or if leave is granted to any to wear Arms, let it be the Sword alone. For a Government that has a numerous People,

People, and all of them arm'd, is in danger from the too great Strength of the Subjects. If this were duly consider'd, and upon mature deliberation an Order past in Council to this effect, it would be no disservice to the Country, if a Sacrifice were made of the Lives of two of the first Transgressors, to teach the rest of the Subjects to pay a dutiful Obedience to the Commands of their Superiors. It is absolutely necessary to use the utmost diligence to hinder the *Avogador* from carrying the Decrees of the Council of Ten, and of the Senate, to be censur'd by the Great Council. If those Decrees deserve Censure, let the same Authority that establish'd them, mitigate and modify them: For otherwise, if they are carried before the Great Council, they will always be repealed, to the total depression of the Power of the Senators, and Exaltation of the Lower Nobility.

As to the Authority of the Council of Ten, I could wish to see it distributed with a scantier hand, and that not only the Dignity of the Magistracy were taken into consideration, but likewise the Worth and Merit of the Persons, because the Authority will be always the more esteem'd, the less common it is; for we know, the Rays
 XXXIII.
The Members of the Council of Ten ought not to be chang'd so often.
 which

which in the Sun are of Gold, when they are communicated to the Moon are only of Silver. We had certainly been much beholden to our Ancestors, if they had fixed a longer time for the continuance of the Members of this Council, both as to the President and Body of the Council. But since what was not done in those first times, cannot well be effected at present, it would be very proper in the mean while, under pretext of not multiplying so many singular Elections, to fix the continuance of this Council for a Year, and by this means to secure the Members of it from those frequent Elections, which are made by Scrutiny in the Senate, in which the Judges of the Councils of Forty, and other Noblemen of the same low Condition, have so great a share. 'Tis true, that by this means the Members of this Council would be free from the Governments that are expensive; but this Immunity would be of no long continuance, since it would expire at the Year's end. It will be objected, that this Expedient which I propose would raise too much the Authority of the Noblemen of the first Rank. But to this I answer, that this Authority cannot occasion any great Inconvenience, since it continues only for

for a few Months ; whereas the present Practice ties up the hands of those Persons who ought to have them at liberty for the dispensing of Justice, they being as it were every week in danger of being toss'd about by the Lower Nobility, who are low in Spirit, as well as in Fortune. I have oftentimes wonder'd, that the Council of Ten, having in its hands not only the Judiciary Power in Criminal Matters, and some share in the Administration of Civil Justice, but likewise being intrusted with the deliberative part of the Government in State Affairs, altho' in this case consisting of a greater number than usual, because of the additional Members, has ever suffer'd itself to be so much limited as it is ; it seeming impossible to me, that at the time that this Council was first establish'd, the lower Nobility could be so very strong, as to hinder those of the first and second Rank from taking it under their Consideration, that it is much better to be subject to a few Noblemen of the first Rank, than to many of the lowest. However, as matters stand at present, we must have recourse to the Prudence of our present Governours, that they may lay hold of the first Opportunity that offers, for supplying, in a secret

E manner

XXXIV.
*Virtue to be
 esteem'd in
 whatsoever
 Person it is
 found.*

manner, and at a great distance, what has been neglected by our Ancestors.

Let Virtue be esteem'd, in whatever Person it is found ; and altho' the Person that is endowed with it be not Noble, yet let him be highly valued, and encouraged to live among us ; for his own Merit makes him Noble sufficiently, and all Hereditary Nobility has its rise from some personal Virtue. If a Merchant, who brings a few perishable Commodities into the Country, is well look'd upon, how much more does a virtuous and ingenious Man deserve to be esteem'd, who leaves among us a Treasure that never perishes ? Let such a Person as this never want any thing towards his Contentment and Satisfaction ; if for no other reason, yet, at least, that he may not lead among us the Life of a Mole, and live in perpetual Darkness and Obscurity.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

The different Methods which are to be used in governing the several Territories belonging to the Republick.

I Come now to speak to the second Point, which is concerning the Government of the Territories belonging to the Republick. As to the Subjects ^{I. How the Subjects on the other side of the Adriatick are to be dealt with.} living on the other side of the *Adriatick*, there is no great occasion of much Speculation about them; because they having no other Neighbours than the *Turk*, and there not being among them Persons of great Wealth, or who have many Dependants, the Republick has nothing else to do, but to shew the Justness and Mildness of their Government, by a careful Choice of good Governours to be sent them. For if those People have Justice faithfully administred to them, and live in plenty, they will never entertain thoughts of any Change of Government. Those few Subjects of *Istria*, and *Dalmatia*, who border upon the Empire, are in no condition to cause any manner of Jealousy: And besides, they are of themselves very well affected to the Republick; so that there is no great Policy

licy requir'd to keep them to their Duty, the usual manner of Government being sufficient, without any Artifice or Cunning. There is no doubt, but greater regard is to be had to the *Greek* Subjects of the Kingdom of *Candia*, and of the Islands of the *Levant*, because the *Grecian* Fidelity is never secure; and it would be no hard matter to persuade them to exchange the Government of the Republick for that of the *Turk*, they having before their eyes the Example of the rest of their own Nation, which live under the *Turkish* Dominion. These People therefore ought to be kept, like wild Beasts, with greater diligence, that they may not be able to use their Teeth, and their Claws, as their natural Wildness leads them to do. The surest way of dealing with them, is to keep good Garrisons, that may hold them to their Duty, to debase their Spirits as much as is possible, and not to be fond of training them up in the Art of War, with design to make use of them in a foreign Invasion. For they will always shew the greater Spite and Ill-will, the greater Force they have, being in this like to the Heat of a Fever, which is more violent in a young Man of hot Blood, than in an old Man whose
Blood

Blood is cooler. These People are of the same nature with Gally-slaves, who, were they treated with Mildness and Affection, would repay the Courtesy with Sedition, and carry both the Gally and Captain into *Algier*. There is nothing for them but Food, and the Rod; and they are never to be trusted with any Authority.

As to the Nobility of the Colonies, they are to be lookt after with a very watchful Eye, because that besides the Wildness of the Climate, and the barbarous Customs they acquire in those Parts, they have the Character of being Noble, which adds to their Force, and encourages their Pretensions, as we see by the many Rebelions in *Candia*. The Use of Colonies was very profitable to the Republick of *Rome*; because the People that were transplanted retaining, even in *Asia* and in *Africa*, the *Roman* Temper, they never lost, in the greatest course of time, their natural Affection to their first Country; but polish'd and civiliz'd the Soil on which they were ingrafted; whereas in *Candia* the Soil has made the very Grasses themselves become wild. If those Noblemen tyrannize over the Country-people, it will be fit to wink at it, that they may not live in great

II.

What Treatment the Nobility of the Colonies ought to have.

Amity with one another ; but if they transgress on any other occasion, they ought to be chastis'd with the utmost severity, that they may have but little reason to boast of their Privilege among the other Inhabitants. No Opportunity ought to be neglected, where there is any shadow of pretext for mortifying those Noblemen ; and if they happen in any case to forfeit their Nobility, they ought not to be restor'd to it but with great difficulty. In a word, the Republick ought to consider, that all the good that was pretended to be reap'd by the Noblemen of the Colonies, is already obtain'd, which was the establishing the Dominion of the Republick over those Countries ; so that for the future the Republick can expect nothing from them but Mischief.

III.
Great Art and
Cunning re-
quir'd in go-
verning the
Subjects of the
Continent.

There is more Art and Cunning requir'd in governing those Subjects that live upon the Continent ; and it is fit to distinguish those who out of an ancient inclination are well affected to the Republick, such as the *Brescians*, *Cremasques*, *Bergamasques*, and *Vicentines* ; and, as occasion offers, to repay their Kindness with some secret Partiality, and to let them see, that the Republick knows, and highly values their hereditary Good-will. As to the other

other Subjects, which have some bent to the Imperial Interest, as those of *Verona*, *Padoa*, and *Trevigio*, it is convenient to make a shew of administering Justice impartially to them, but never to let slip any occasion of humbling them. The Enmities they have among themselves ought to be wink'd at, because from these arise two Benefits to the Publick, private Discords, and publick Confiscations.

Let all Extortions upon the Inhabitants of the Provinces be punish'd with the utmost rigour, that the People may be induced to have a liking to the Government, because of the particular Protection they receive from it. But when any Taxes, or Aids, are imposed by publick Authority, they never ought to be heard in any Complaint against them. And we ought always to remember what happen'd in the Year 1606, when a League was very near being concluded between the Inhabitants of *Brescia*, and those of *Verona*, for getting the Taxes that were laid upon them to be taken off. Neither ought we ever to forget the insolent Behaviour of the *Brescian* Ambassadors at that time in the College, which differ'd very little from a specious Sedition. It is fit that they know by experience, that

IV.
All Extortions upon them to be punish'd; but when they are tax'd by publick Authority, never to hear their Complaints against it.

when

when once a Tax is laid upon them, there is no possibility of avoiding it; that so they may lay aside all thoughts of attempting any ease in that matter. If there are any of the Members of the Councils of those Provinces, who are known to be of a very resolute Temper, or not very dutiful in obeying the publick Orders, it is fit either to ruin them entirely, or to purchase their Good-will, tho' to the publick Cost; for a small Mass of Leaven is able to ferment a great quantity of Bread. It will likewise be convenient, as occasion offers, to diminish their Privileges. The Taxes however ought not to be so excessive, as to occasion Scarcity among them; for altho' a Man may be persuaded to give to the Publick what he has over-much, yet he will not so easily part with what is necessary to his Maintenance. It would not be amiss to learn what Taxes are laid upon the Inhabitants of the Dutchy of *Milan*, which borders upon those Provinces; and to order matters so, as that the *Venetian* Subjects be always less tax'd than their Neighbours, besides the advantage they have of being freed from Garrisons, which is one of the greatest Oppressions the Subjects of any Government can be expos'd to.

No

No Persons ought to be allowed to purchase Lands or Houses in *Brescia*, except the Inhabitants of that Province. For if it were permitted to the *Venetians* to settle in that most fertile Country, we should soon see the same effect in that Province, as we see in *Padoua*, where scarcely a third part of the Lands remain in the Possession of the original Inhabitants.

V.

None but Brescians to be allowed to purchase Lands or Houses in that Province.

If it happens that there is in the Country a Lady of a great Fortune, it will be proper to try all fair, and insinuating Means for getting her married to some Noble *Venetian*; and that for two Reasons, that by this means the *Venetian* Nobility may be enriched, and the others impoverish'd; both which Effects are equally conducive to the Publick Good.

VI.

The Women of great Fortunes to be married to some Noble Venetian.

Great care ought to be taken, that the Persons who are sent Governours to those Provinces be Men of great and generous Souls, that the Inhabitants may not in the least scruple to own them for Princes; for we know, that every Man believes his Eyes, more than his Ears.

VII.

The Governours that are sent thither, ought to be Men of generous Souls.

If there offer any occasions of employing the Gentlemen of those Provinces in publick Offices, for their own private Advantage, they ought not

VIII.

The Gentlemen of the Provinces to be employed in Countries distant from their

*own. Heads of
Parties to be
exterminated.*

not to be neglected. But it will be convenient to employ them in Countries distant from their own, and for as long a time as is possible; that they may have the greater Difficulty, when they return to their native Country, to regain an Interest in it, by renewing their former Acquaintances. If there are among them any Heads of a Party, let all Occasions be laid hold on for exterminating them, But if any such are Generals in the Army, it will not be fit to condemn them to a publick Execution; it will be more prudent to employ Poison instead of a Hangman, because the Advantage will be the same, and the Hatred the less.

IX.

*All enormous
Crimes to be
carried before
the Council of
Ten. Sentences of Banishment to be rigorously put
in Execution.*

It is fit that all enormous Crimes, committed in the Provinces, be carried before the Council of Ten, because a remote Power is always most respected; and then it is not so easie to slander Judges that live at a distance. If the Offenders are in the Army, let them be sent upon Expeditions into far Countries, that their long Absence from their native Country may serve as a part of their Punishment. If Criminals that are under Sentence of Banishment presume to return to their Country, let them be prosecuted with the utmost Rigour; because

because there is no greater Demonstration of Contempt in the Subject, and of Weakness in the Prince, than for a Criminal to dare to tarry within the Dominions of his Sovereign, after he has receiv'd Sentence of Banishment. It is the same height of Impudence, as if one should pretend to haunt another Man's House in spite of the Master.

The Bishopricks, and Church Benefices in the Provinces, ought to be left to the Natives of each Province. For by this means the Noble *Venetians* will avoid the Accusation of Coverousness, as if they were ready to settle themselves in any Country, where they can better their condition. Besides, if these Church Preferments are left to the Nobility of the Provinces, it will encourage them to lead a lazy slothful Life; and the prospect of getting a Livelihood easily this way, will divert them from the thoughts of making their Fortune by the War; so that it will be convenient to let them enjoy this Shadow of Liberty in their State of Bondage. But as it is profitable, on the one hand, for the Republick to have the Natives of the Provinces advanced to Bishopricks; so, on the other hand, it is no less prejudicial to suffer them to be promoted to the Cardinalship; and therefore all possible

X.

The Church Preferments of the Provinces to be left to the Natives; but none of them to be suffer'd to be promoted to the Cardinalship.

fible ways are to be used to hinder it, because they will disdain the Quality of a Subject, when they are once raised to the Purple Dignity, which has usurp'd the Precedency of the Doge himself.

XI.

The Provinces to be allowed to confer their Nobility on such Persons as they please. The Families that take Service under other Princes to be discouraged.

Every Province ought to be allowed to dispense its own Nobility to such as the Council of the Province approves of, that a Door may be left open for the debasing it by the Numbers that are aggregated; but it is fit that the Persons who are dignified with the Nobility, be obliged to ask a Confirmation of it from the Senate. Care must be taken to discourage, upon all occasions, those Families that have any of their Descendants engaged in the Service of other Princes; and the Government, by discountenancing them, ought to give them this private Intimation, That he deserves but little at the Hands of his own Sovereign, who attempts to make his Fortune under another Prince.

XII.

If any Nobleman of the Provinces quarrels with a Noble Venetian in Venice, he ought to be punished severely; but if the Quarrel falls out in the Provinces, then it is fit to deal more gently with him.

If any Gentleman of the Provinces happens to have a Quarrel with any Noble Venetian at Venice, it will be fit to resent the Affront publicly, and with Rigour, if the Country Gentleman is in the wrong. But if the Quarrel happens in the Province to which the Gentleman belongs, there it

it will be prudent to deal a little more gently with him, unless he has offer'd some very great Violence to the *Venetian* Nobleman; that the Subjects of the Provinces may be sensible, that they live under the Government of a Prince of an unbiass'd Justice; and that the Noble *Venetians* may avoid the having any Quarrels in the Provinces, when they see the Government disposed to protect the Nobility of those Countries.

The Cittadels of the most considerable Cities ought to be kept in good Repair, and well provided with every thing necessary, that they may not only serve as Bulwarks to the State against the Incurfions of a foreign Enemy, but that they may likewise keep in awe the contumacious Citizens. XIII.
Cittadels serve as Bulwarks against a foreign Enemy; and keep the rebellious Citizens in awe.
 There is nothing encourages Criminals more, than the hopes of avoiding the Punishment due to their Crime. For if an Offender were perswaded that he had no way left him to escape from the Hands of Justice, he would never offend; and that Prince is sufficiently guarded, who is believed to be able to revenge himself of any Injury that is done him. It is fit always to remember, that as it is a hard matter to meet with a Monk, or a married Woman, who has not some time or other repented

repented the divesting themselves of the Free-will which they had from their Birth ; so it is no less difficult a thing to find a People, that is not sorry for having subjected themselves to the power of others, since Nature at first made them free.

CHAP. III.

What Regards the Republick ought to have in its Treaties with other Princes.

I.
*The Pope consider'd in his
Spiritual Capacity.*

IN speaking to this third Point, concerning the Interest of the Republick with respect to other Princes, I shall begin with the Pope, who is the first in Dignity, altho' not in Power. He is to be consider'd under a double Capacity, as he is a Spiritual Prince, and as he is a Temporal Monarch. As to the Pope's Spiritual Dominion, I have already given some Cautions about it, and shall here subjoin what is wanting. I cannot here forbear remarking the wonderful Prosperity of that Monarchy, which from a miserable persecuted State, when the first Chri-

Christians could not assemble together to perform their Devotions but by Stealth, and when they were forced to purchase the Exercise of their Religion with the Blood of their Martyrs, is now advanced to such a pitch of Greatness, that all Kings and Princes pay Homage to the Bishop of *Rome*, with Adoration, and with kissing his Toe. God has been pleas'd in this manner to make known the Reward which attends the Christian Religion, by raising to the highest degree of Grandeur those Persons that are the Founders and Teachers of it; but the Piety of Princes has not a little contributed towards it, and among them *Constantine* was the first Benefactor. This Prince not only embraced the Christian Faith, but gave Peace to the Church, and endowed it with Revenues; and after him all the Emperors and Kings one after another strove who should give most to the Church. But it is a thing altogether unaccountable, how, besides the Reverence and Respect they paid to the Bishop of *Rome*, they came to be prevail'd with to yield up the Jurisdiction and Power they had over him. For the Space of six hundred Years after the Birth of our Saviour, the Pope was confirm'd by the Emperors, and,

and, in their Absence, by their Exarchs; and in those Days, the Date of the Bulls of the Popes run in this manner, *In the Reign of such a one our Sovereign Lord*, The Emperor *Justinian*, in the Year 518, sent from *Constantinople* his Ambassadors to Pope *Celius Hormisdas*, that they might confirm the Authority of the Apostolick See, and proclaim Peace to the Church. In the Year 584, *Constantine* the Second granted to Pope *Benedict II.* that for the future the Election of the Pope should be made by the Clergy, and People of *Rome*, without any Confirmation from the Emperor, or the Exarch; and this he did without considering that the Holiness of those times might be converted into political Interest. Afterwards *Boniface* the Third obtain'd from *Phocas* the Emperor, that all the Churches should pay Obedience to the Church of *Rome*. Then in the Year 708 *Justin* the Second was the first that kiss'd the Toe of Pope *Constantine*. But in Recompence of Favours received from the Kings of *France*, Pope *Adrian* the First, in a Council of a hundred and fifty three Bishops, gave to *Charles* the First, King of *France*, who was afterwards called *Charles the Great*, Power to chuse the Pope. This was
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in the Year 773. However, *Lewis* the Godly did not long keep this Grant, which his Father had obtain'd from the Pope; he having exchanged this Regal Authority with the imaginary Title of *Godly*; to which we may join that of *Simple*.

How scandalous soever the Emperors of those Days were in their Lives, yet the Popes thought fit to connive at their Licentiousness, and to leave them to be punish'd by the Hand of God. But in the Year 713, *Philip Bardaneus* the Emperor, having fallen into Heresie, reap'd the Reward of the Honours and Privileges which his Predecessors had granted to the Popes, he having been excommunicated by Pope *Constantine*; and this was the first time that the Imperial Authority was made subject to the Pontifical. The Church of *Milan* would not own any Dependence on the Church of *Rome*, and for two hundred Years asserted its Liberty, as being the Church that was honour'd with the Presence of the Emperor, when he was in *Italy*, and perpetually with the Residence of the Exarch in the Emperor's Absence. But at last in the Year 1057, the Church of *Milan* yielded up its Pretensions to Pope *Stephen* the IXth, who was elected by the Cardinals;

II.

About what time the Popes began first to excommunicate the Emperors.

exclusively of the People. I have been the more full in relating all these Particulars, that it may appear in what manner this spiritual Monarchy has by degrees risen to its present pitch of Greatness, to which the good Nature of Princes has contributed no less, than the Cunning of the Popes, in improving all Opportunities to the Advancement of their own Power.

III.

*The Emperors
are now chosen
by the Pontifi-
cal Authority;
the Electors of
the Empire de-
riving their
Power of Ele-
ction from the
Popes.*

At present the Emperor is chose by the Pontifical Authority, by virtue of a Bull of Pope *Gregory*, which gives the Right of Election to the Ecclesiastical and Secular Electors of the Empire, and obliges the Emperor Elect to be confirm'd, and crown'd by the Pope. So that the Subject is now become Sovereign over his own Prince, to the great Discredit of *Otho* the Emperor, who in the Year 994 granted to the Pope this Power of Election, as an Ornament, as he pretended, to the *German* Nation; but he thereby greatly impair'd the Authority of the Emperor, and destroyed intirely the hereditary Right of Succession, and put his Successors under an Obligation of being elected. The Pope having in this manner made himself free, soon after brought all the other Bishops into Subjection, and got himself to be own'd as the first in Dignity,

Dignity, and Jurisdiction, preferably to the other four Patriarchs, of *Antioch, Alexandria, Constantinople, and Jerusalem*. This over-ruling Star ought therefore to serve as a Warning to all well govern'd States, that they may narrowly watch all Occasions, in which the Papal Authority dilates it self, altho' insensibly; 'because every Favour of the Prince, in process of a few Years, will be construed as a Debt; and the Popes, to maintain themselves in Possession, will not fail to fulminate Anathemas and Excommunications against all that oppose them.

It is a matter worthy of great Consideration, the Custom, or rather Abuse, that has crept in among us, of the Popes having a Power to depose Kings, and to give away their Kingdoms to others, under pretext of their having govern'd them ill. The prodigal Son in the Gospel did not lose his Right to the Share he had by Law in his Father's Estate, altho' he did what he could to dissipate it; because the right which one has to a thing by Nature, is never separated from him in his Life time, unless by a Fiction of the Law. The Kings of *Navarre* were sent a wandering over the World by a Scroll of Parchment, which was the Bull of *Julius* Ild, by which he

IV.

The Popes claim a Power of deposing Kings, and erecting Kingdoms.

excommunicated King *John*, and made over his Kingdom to the first Possessor. And were it not that Providence reserved for them the Succession to the Crown of *France*, there would not at this time be so much as mention made of a King of *Navarre*. Besides the Right which the Popes claim of taking away Kingdoms, they pretend likewise to a Power of erecting them; as *Paul IV.* pretended to make *Ireland* a Kingdom, and *Pius V.* to erect *Toscany* into a Great Duchy, and to deprive Queen *Elizabeth* of the Kingdom of *England*. *Philip II.* King of *Spain*, according to the Custom of his Ancestors, undertook to be Executioner of the Pope's Sentence, and for that end took the Field; but he soon found that he had to encounter as Enemies, Heaven, the Elements, and the Arms of *England*; so that the long Suspension which this Sentence has met with, may tempt us to believe that it will at this time prove ineffectual.

V.

France would never acknowledge this deposing Power; England, on the contrary, has several times made it self tributary to the Popes.

In *France*, whether it is because of the Privilege of the *Gallican Church*, or because of the lively Temper of the People, they do not admit of any Bulls which concern State-deprivation; both because they neither allow the Pope's Deprivation, nor the Right of

of Occupation after it ; but maintain the Right of Succession, or Election, to the Persons to whom it belongs. And in effect, to deprive the reigning Prince, and to give away his Kingdom to the first Possessor, is not only to punish the supposed Delinquent, but at the same time to chastise the innocent Successor, or Elector. The Kingdom of *England* has taken quite another course in this matter than that of *France*, it having thought fit several times to make it self tributary to the See of *Rome*, by paying a hundred Marks of Gold, which is call'd *Peter-pence*. The first time was in the Pontificate of *Leo IV*. The second was in the Year 1214, to avert the Invasion they were threaten'd with from *France*. But *Henry VIII*. has once for all redeem'd the Nation from this Bondage, and restor'd both himself and his Subjects to the Possession of their antient natural Rights.

We have a Home-example in *Paul V*. VI. of the Charity of the Popes, in taking upon them to govern their Neighbour's House, under Pretext that the Master does not govern it aright. But the Firmness and Resolution which the Republick shewed on that occasion, will make the Court of *Rome* more wary for the future, how they

*The Difference
between Pope
Paul V. and the
Republick of
Venice.*

intrude themselves into other Peoples Concerns; they having been forced to come to an Accommodation, which was not much for their Credit, they having tacitly yielded up their Pretensions. For to ask a thing, and not to obtain it, is a sign that the Demand is not well grounded. The Refusal of the Absolution, is a certain Proof that the Excommunication was not valid; so that the Dispute which the Republick had with that Pope, has been more beneficial than prejudicial to the State; in the same manner as a little Disorder in ones Stomach, when it is conquer'd, contributes to the Health of the Person. If ever the Republick should hereafter be put under Interdiction, which I hope will never happen, it will be proper to cause to be affixed in *Rome* an Appeal to the first General Council, which would occasion a great Alarm at the Court. For such an Appeal produces two considerable Effects; first, it revives the Memory of a Council, and makes them believe there are still Persons who entertain hopes of seeing one assembled; and then it insinuates the Superiority of a Council to the Pope, which is a point that gives the greatest Jealousie to those that stickle most for the Pope's Authority.

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The Republick, by examining carefully every Bull that comes from *Rome*, and by continuing to observe the things that have been practis'd hitherto, may hope not to be brought under greater Subjection than other Princes; nay, to enjoy some more Liberty than others do, especially the *Spaniards*, to whom it turns to account to bear patiently with the Tyranny of the Court of *Rome*, because they receive from thence considerable Benefits, and then they value themselves on their being zealous Defenders of the Pope's Authority. In effect, the Popes have never shewn any great Favour to the Republick, except in the Privilege which *Alexander III.* granted, with the Honours of the Staff of Command, the Umbrello, and the Standards, which serve rather as a remembrance of that illustrious Action, than that they have in themselves Qualities, which the Doge might not have assumed of his own accord, without any such Grant from the Pope. If we except the Grant of the Tenth of the Clergy, and the Right of Nomination to the Bishopricks, this Republick has but very little experimented the Liberality of the Popes. So that this may serve as an Excuse, if the Republick retain to it self the Cognizance

VII.

The Republick never much favour'd by the Popes, and therefore has the more reason to watch narrowly over all their Motions.

nizance of all Causes concerning Church Benefices, and if, upon occasion, it minds its own Interest, without having any great regard to Complement. I shall say no more of the Pope's Spiritual Capacity, but proceed in the next place to consider him as a Temporal Prince.

VIII.

The Pope consider'd as a Temporal Prince.

In examining the Secular State of the Church of Rome, I shall consider these five Particulars, which shall serve as a Rule in the Enquiry I am to make into the State of other Princes.

First, Whether it is for the Interest of the Republick, that the Church increase its Territories?

Secondly, What Pretence of Right, what Inclination, and Conveniency the Pope may have to possess himself of any part of the Territories belonging to the Republick?

Thirdly, What pretence of Right, Conveniency, and Inclination the Republick may have to seize upon any part of the Territories belonging to the Church?

Fourthly, Whether the Church may probably enter into a League with the Republick, to seize upon the Dominions of other Princes?

Fifthly, Whether the Church may enter into a League with other Princes,

ces, to stop the Progress of the Republick?

To the *First* of these Questions I may return a general Answer, That it is never the Interest of a Prince, who is any way considerable for his Power and Strength, and who has a mind to maintain himself free and independent by his own Force, that any other Prince should increase in Power, except it be by lessening the Dominions of a third Prince, who is more powerful than either of them. And if the Prince who attempts to enlarge his Territories be a Neighbour, there is still the greater reason to be afraid of his Advancement. These Changes are convenient for a Prince that is weak and inconsiderable, and who, for that reason, is not unwilling to have a Dependence on the Prince who increases his Dominions, hoping to receive from him the Benefit of Protection against other Princes, who would oppress him. But to give a more particular Answer to this Question. If the Church should get Possession of any of the Dominions in *Italy* belonging to the King of *Spain*, who is the first Potentate of *Italy*, it would not be disliked by the Republick of *Venice*, which is the second Sovereign State, because by this means

IX.
Whether it is for the Interest of the Republick, that the Church of Rome increase its Territories?

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it might come to be the first. And the Forces of the Church would always give less Jealousie than those of *Spain*, because of the condition of the Principality, which is Elective, and Temporary, and which changes its Views, and its Inclination, according to the Vacancies of the See; whereas the Monarchy of *Spain* is Hereditary, and Perpetual, and is always govern'd by the same Maxims. But if the Church should increase its Dominions with the Spoils of any *Italian* Prince, it would then be the Interest of the Republick to oppose any such Advancement, because the Damage, and Danger of it is evident, and it is impossible that any manner of good could accrue thereby. It is fit to consider, to what degree the Church has increas'd its Dominions this last Age. The antient Custom of giving away the Lands of the Church in Fees, and the great Facility with which they were obtain'd, had reduced the Church to such a poor condition, that it was become a Sovereign State in appearance, more than in reality, in shew, more than Substance. But Pope *Julius* the 11d, who succeeded to *Alexander* VI, took from Duke *Valentino* all that he had taken by force from a great many petty Tyrants.
So

So that in a little time the Church had, by this means, *Bolonia*, *Romagna*, (which was to the detriment of the Republick, because of *Cervia*, *Rimini*, *Ravenna*, *Faenza*, *Imola*, and other Towns) and afterwards the Dutchy of *Ferrara* under *Clement VIII*, and then last of all the Dutchy of *Urbino*; which States alone, without any addition, are able to make a considerable Principality. There remains nothing for the Church to acquire in *Italy*, except *Parma*, and *Piacenza*, and some little inconsiderable Castles about *Rome*. So that the Church in its present State and Condition, and by the disuse of alienating the Lands that belong to it, is become very considerable for its Temporal Dominion; and to such a degree, that a farther Enlargement of its Territories would give jealousy, and might prove of dangerous consequence to every Prince in *Italy*. Wherefore I don't believe it is necessary to bring any other Reason to enforce this Point, that it is not for the Interest of the Republick, that the Church increase its Dominion in Temporals.

As to the second point, concerning the Pretence of Right, the Inclination, and Conveniency, the Pope may have to possess himself of any part of the

X.

What Pretence
of Right, what
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part of the Ter-
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publick?

the Territories belonging to the Republick. To this I answer, that the Court of Rome professing the highest Justice, (altho' the Justice of Princes is always more in outward shew, than in reality, and design'd only to discountenance Usurpation in other Princes) I can hardly believe the Pope will claim a Right to any of the Territories of the Republick, except it be the *Polesine di Rouigo*, which was annex'd to the Republick in the time of the Dukes of *Ferrara*. And I don't question but the Popes would be very ready to revive their Pretensions to this, if they had any hopes of Success; considering that in times past they appear'd always most zealous Defenders of the Dukes of *Ferrara* against the Republick. The Popes put out no less than four Bulls of Excommunication against the Republick on this occasion. The first was in the Year 1306, by *Clement V.* because of the Republick's invading the Territories of *Ferrara*. The second was in the Year 1483, in the Pontificate of *Sixtus IV.* when the Republick besieged and took *Ferrara*, at the Instigation of the said Pope. But the Pope having afterwards made peace with the Duke, fulminated an Excommunication against the Republick, because

cause they refused to give back what they had possess'd themselves of by the Law of War. However, a Peace was concluded the Year following, by which the *Venetians* remain'd Masters of the *Polesine di Rovigo*. The third Excommunication was in the Year 1505, under *Julius* the II, because of the Republick's seizing upon the Cities of *Romagna*. And the last and most recent of all, was in the time of *Paul V*. Since the Popes interested themselves so much in this matter, when the Loss fell immediately on the Dukes of *Ferrara*, it is not to be doubted but they would espouse the same Interest at present, when the Advantage would accrue immediately to themselves. So that we have good ground to believe, that the Popes still claim a Right to this part of the Territories of the Republick, and that they do not want Inclination to assert it, whenever they see a favorable Opportunity. The next thing we are to do, is to enquire what Conveniency the Popes have for recovering this Territory to which they claim a Right. And as to this, I am persuaded that of themselves they would never be able to do it, and that they will never attempt it by their own Force; and unless they warm themselves

selves at other People's Fire, as happen'd under Pope *Julius*, they will never have heat enough to be able to march over that marshy Country. But if they weigh'd well the true and solid Reason of the Liberty of *Italy*, they would never, in hopes of this little Gain, enter into a League against the Republick of *Venice*. Because it is the Interest of *Italy* not to weaken its most powerful Princes, but rather to contribute to their Greatness, that, in case of any Invasion from beyond the *Alps*, they may be the better able to defend the Country. But the same Reason was as strong against Pope *Julius*, and yet when it came in competition with his particular Interest, it had no manner of Influence on him. So that we are not to hope for greater Prudence in these latter times, than what we have seen in former Ages; and therefore have reason to conclude, that if any powerful foreign Prince should offer to restore to the Church this Portion of the Territories of the Republick, the Popes would make no manner of scruple to embrace it.

XI.

*What Pretence
of Right, what
Conveniency,
and Inclination
the Republick
may have to
seize*

The third Doubt is, what Pretence of Right, Conveniency, and Inclination the Republick may have to seize upon any part of the Territories belonging to the Church? To this I reply

ply, that the Republick may have ^{seize upon any} very good reason to attempt the Re ^{part of the}covery of the^a Territory it lost by the ^{Territories be-} Battle of *Ghiara d'Adda*; a Territory ^{longing to the} which the Republick had not usurp'd ^{Church?} from the Church, but had acquir'd by the voluntary Surrender of the People, or by Conquest from those petty Tyrants, who in the past Ages took advantage of the Negligence of the Popes, and of the slothful lazy Temper of the *Italians*, who submitted their Necks tamely to the Yoke of every little Tyrant that had a mind to govern them. That Territory was lost, or rather, to speak more properly, yielded up, to prevent any more Fewel from being added to the vast Fire that was kindled against the Republick by all the Christian Princes in the League of *Cambray*. There is no manner of doubt, were the Circumstances of time favourable, that the Republick would have a very lawful and just Pretext for recovering

^a By the Territory here mention'd, Father Paul means the Towns of *Ravenna*, *Foenza*, *Imola*, *Cervia*, and other Places in the Country of *Romagna*, which, after the Defeat of the *Venetian* Army at *Ghiara d'Adda*, surrender'd themselves to the Arms of Pope *Julius* the 2^d. *Guicciard. Hist. d'Italia. lib. 8.*

this Country. And I am apt likewise to think, that there would be no want of inclination in them to do it, since the desire of Dominion is as natural to Princes, as the desire of Meat is to a living Man. The only point is in the Conveniency the Republick might have for executing its Designs; and here I find it would be entirely at a loss. For there is no Prince; but who would, either out of a real Observance, or at least a shew of Religion, oppose the bereaving the Church of any of its Dominions. And since there is no Prince of *Italy* so powerful, as to bid defiance to all the other Princes, when their Forces are united together, and who would attempt to do himself Justice by the Strength of his own Arm, it is to no purpose to expect to see the Dominions of the Church any way lessen'd.

XII.
Whether the Church may probably enter into a League with the Republick to seize upon the Dominions of other Princes?

The fourth Question is, whether the Church may probably enter into a League with the Republick, to seize upon the Dominions of other Princes? To this I answer negatively, it not being probable that the Church and the Republick can ever unite together to make Conquests upon other Princes. If the Country to be conquer'd were such as the Church had any Pretensions to, then it would readily join with

with the Republick to conquer it upon its own account, but not to divide it; so that what would be pleasing to the Pope in this case, would not be so very acceptable to the Republick. And it is not very likely that the Church will ever join in conquering a Country to which it has no manner of Claim, since it would be no Gainer by such a Conquest; and I can hardly think, that, to make it self a Gainer by the War, it would attempt to rob the Republick of any of its Territories. To this we ought to add the consideration of the Temper and Inclination of the Popes, who, for the most part, have no other Desire than to maintain the Dominions of the Church in the same condition they found them, and to preserve to themselves the universal Respect of the Princes. Besides, in the declining Age in which the Popes are usually advanced to the Papacy, they have only private thoughts of raising their own Families, and think but little of enlarging their Dominions; they seeing that they can have but a very short time to enjoy them, and that they would be obliged to lay out vast Sums of Money on such Conquests; which would otherwise remain in their own Pockets, and serve to enrich their

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nearest Relations. The Temper of Pope *Julius II.* was fatal to all *Italy*, but more especially to the Republick of *Venice*, he having been the chief Instrument in concerting the League of *Cambray*. However, it cannot be denied, that for one born in a mean Condition, he had a most noble publick Spirit; he did not amuse himself with enriching his own Family, and claim'd no other share in his Conquests, than the bare Applause of the Court.

XIII.
Whether the
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into a
League with
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to stop the Pro-
gress of the Re-
publick?

The fifth and last Point propos'd to be consider'd, is, whether the Church may enter into a League with other Princes, to stop the Progress of the Republick? This Question depends, in a great measure, on the former. And I don't believe it will be an easy matter, to get the Pope to join with other Princes in seizing upon any of the Territories belonging to the Republick. For to encrease the Power of that other Prince with whom the Alliance is to be made, would be no manner of advantage to the Church. And for the Church to take to her self the Spoils of the War, it would not suit very well with the strict Justice she professes; unless the Conquest were some Country to which she claims a Right, as has been already said. 'Tis

TRUE

true, should any of those terrible Excommunications be fulminated, by which Princes are divested of their Dominions, and their Right transferred to the first Possessor, this being an universal Warrant for every body; might likewise serve for the Church, to seize upon the Dominions of the Prince that is excommunicated. But matters are never push'd to this extremity, except when the Prince is a violent Persecutor of the Church; a thing never to be dreaded from the Republick, which has always been so exemplary in Piety and Religion. There is no manner of doubt, but an Alliance might be easily fram'd between the Pope and another Prince, to stop the Progress of the Arms of the Republick, if they were turn'd against a Prince who has a Dependence on the Church. Nay, altho' the Prince attack'd by the Republick could lay no claim to the Protection of the Church; yet if he were a weak poor Prince, the Pope might readily be induced to enter into a League for his defence, under the colour of Justice, in protecting the weaker from being oppress'd. But if it were a strong powerful Prince, with whom the Republick were engaged in War, one who is not united to the Church

by any antient League or Alliance, I am apt to think, that, whatever Advantages the Republick might have in the War, the Pope would remain neuter, and not concern himself in the matter; it being more for the Interest of the Court of *Rome* to lessen the Power and Strength of that great Prince, than to keep the Republick under, which gives less Jealousy to the Court of *Rome*, in as much as it has no manner of pretence to those antient ticklish Claims, which some other Princes might be apt to revive. And this shall suffice as to the Enquiry into the Interest of the Republick with respect to the Court of *Rome*.

XIV.

Whether it is for the Interest of the Republick, that the Emperor enlarge his Dominions?

I shall in the next place proceed to examine the Political Interests that are between the Emperor and the Republick. And here the Republick ought not to forget That grand Reason which all Princes have to oppose the growth of the Empire, lest it should revive its antient Claims and Pretensions, and especially in *Italy*. The Dominion of the Commonwealth of *Rome*, which gave Law to almost all the known World, and which by the Fortune and Valour of *Julius Caesar*, was afterwards transferred upon him and his Successors, might give a colourable Pretext to the Emperor,

to call all Sovereigns to a new account ; and many who wear now a Crown, might perhaps be reduced to return to the Plough, if their Cause were to be decided in the open Field, and Sentence pronounced by the Mouth of Cannon. It is therefore the Interest of all Princes, that the Emperor keep himself within the bounds of his *Germany*, where the Cold may benumn his Members, and disable him from giving disturbance to his Neighbours. It is to be consider'd, that the Republick has reason to suspect the Emperor on many Heads. As Emperor, because of the Dutchy of *Friuli*, and the *Marca Trivigiana*, under which Country is included, according to the antient Geography, besides *Trevigi*, likewise *Padoua*, *Vicenza*, and *Verona*. As Arch-Duke of *Austria*, he is to be suspected, because of his Pretensions to the Country of *Istria* ; and as King of *Hungary*, because of *Zara*, and the adjacent Country. So that the Republick has great reason to be jealous of the Emperor, both because of his great Pretensions, and likewise because of his nearness to their Confines. All these Countries are much antienter than the City of *Venice* ; so that they being in subjection to a

Metropolitan City of a much fresher Date than themselves, it would give occasion to call in doubt the Lawfulness of the Title; and the rather, because these Claims that lay buried in Antiquity, have been sufficiently reviv'd by the League of *Cambray*, I say, therefore, without any manner of Hesitation, that it is the Interest of the Republick that the Empire be kept low, both upon the general account of the Peace and Quiet of *Europe*, and likewise because of its own particular Concern.

XV.

What Pretence of Right, what Inclination, and Conveniency, the Emperor may have to seize upon any of the Territories belonging to the Republick?

From these Considerations it is easie to gather, that the Emperor neither wants Pretences, nor Inclination, to seize upon some of the Territories belonging to the Republick. And this Inclination has been nourish'd in him by the antient Claims of his Predecessors, and by the little Respect he pretends was paid him by the Republick in the time of his Disasters, when they built the Fort of *Palma* under his Nose. All this will easily admit of Belief. It remains therefore to be enquir'd into, what Conveniency the Emperor has to assert his Claim. As matters stand at present while the Emperor is overpower'd by the Hereticks, I do not believe that he, upon his own Bottom alone, would willingly engage himself

himself in a War with the Republick, which is as powerful in Money, as the Emperor is in Men; but at the long run, whoever has Money, may have Men; and whoever has Men, must spend his Money. 'Tis true, that the Emperor's Country bordering on the Territories of the Republick, would add to his Force, because a lesser number of Men would be requisite for an Invasion. However, unless the War were denounced in the Name of the Empire, in which case all the *German* Nation would perhaps concur, and then the Emperor would have his Army paid for some time; I am apt to believe, that the Emperor by himself, and only with his Patrimonial Territories, would not be able to make any great Progress against the Republick. And what confirms me the more in this Belief, is, because a great many Heretical Princes, and Free Cities in *Germany* are engaged, for their particular Interests, to oppose the Emperor's Greatness. The Emperor, 'tis true, by his nearness to our Confines, has the Conveniency of making an Incurſion into the Territories of the Republick whenever he pleases; but then he has not wherewithal to maintain a long War. This was the true Cause of building the Fort

of *Palma*, that it might serve as a Bulwark against Invasions, by giving Shelter to the Country People, and by stopping the Fury of the Enemy at least for some time; which Interruption of their Progress is no less advantageous to the Republick, than it is noxious to the Invader. So that the Emperor, unless he have Supplies of Money from some other State, will be able to make but small Progress in a War against the Republick, let him have never so numerous an Army. We may remember what happen'd in the time of the Emperor *Maximilian*, who, before the Siege of *Padoua*, appear'd with an Army, which was then in the Pay of the Republick; and soon after declaring War against the Republick, he invested *Padoua* with Forty thousand fighting Men; but the Siege lasted only forty Days, and at last he was forced to raise it without any Success. I am persuaded therefore, that it will be no easie matter for the Emperor to recover any of the Countries that are in the Hands of the Republick, both because of the Difficulty of the Enterprize, as also because of the Jealousie the Emperor may conceive, lest, when he is engaged in a War with the Republick, those *German* Princes, who are as
much

much divided from him in Inclination, as they are in Faith, should lay hold on that Opportunity for making Innovations in the vital Parts of the Empire.

Let us, in the next place, enquire, XVI.
 what pretence of Right, what Inclination, and Conveniency, the Republick may have to seize on any part of the Emperor's Country. There is no doubt, but the Republick might put in its Claim to *Goritia* and *Gradisca*, which formerly belonged to the Family of the *Frangipani*, and was heretofore under the Dominion of the Republick, altho' but for a short while; and likewise to some Castles in *Istria*, and to *Trieste* on the Seacoast. And I believe likewise, there is no want of Inclination in the Republick to recover these places; since Disinterestedness, which is applauded as a generous Virtue in private Persons, is censur'd as a Defect in Princes. But the main Point lies always in the Conveniency of recovering what we pretend to be our Right; for whoever has that, is more than half way advanced towards the obtaining of Justice; and on the other hand, it is Prudence not to insist on our Right, when we have not the Conveniency of doing our selves Justice. Now I don't

What Pretence of Right, what Inclination, and Conveniency, the Republick may have to seize on any part of the Emperor's Country?

don't see the Republick has this Con-
veniency, of regaining those Places it
claims a Right to ; because to attack
the Country, the Republick would be
obliged to make vast Preparations ; I
mean to attack the Inland Country.
For as to *Trieſte*, which lies on the
Sea-coaſt, it would be as eaſie a mat-
ter to take it, as it would be difficult
to keep it. Then again on the Em-
peror's ſide, the Defence would be
both vigorous and ready, he being a-
ble, in an inſtant, to raiſe a numerous
Army for the Defence of his Country ;
So that it would be to no purpoſe to
think of making a Conqueſt this way,
unleſs the War were begun by ſome
other Prince. Then indeed it would
not be improper for the Republick
to lay hold of that Opportunity for
recovering its Right, that by the
means of a Peace, which, ſooner or
later, is the end of every War, that
Country which the Republick claims
a Right to in the Empire, or at leaſt
a part of it, may remain to the Re-
publick by Agreement, as a Compen-
ſation for the Charges it has been at
in the War, and the other Damages it
has ſuſtain'd. In a word, for the
Republick to enter into a War barely
for the Recovery of thoſe Places it
pretends a Right to in *Germany*, would
be

be a Deliberation no ways suitable to the Prudence, and Maturity of the *Venetian* Counsels. It were much better to wait for an Opportunity of the Emperor's being in great Straits for want of Money, which happens very often, and then to purchase those Places with ready Money, and let them cost never so great Sums, the Money would be well spent. But in case of a Purchase, those Places not being a part of the Emperor's Patrimonial State, it would be necessary to have the Sale ratified by the Princes of the Empire, that they may have no ground to renew a Claim hereafter.

That the Emperor should enter into an Alliance with the Republick, for conquering the Dominions of other Princes, is what cannot readily happen here in *Italy*. For the Emperor will never unite against *Spain*; neither will he readily enter into a League against the Church, he setting up to be the Church's Advocate. Then as to the lesser Princes of *Italy*. *Modena*, *Mantoua*, and *Mirandola*, are Fees of the Empire. *Savoy* and *Florence* are at a great distance, so that there is no getting at their Dominions without passing over the Territories of greater Princes which lie in the way. And therefore this Union seems

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to,

to be altogether impossible, what with the Difficulty of it in some Cases, and the want of Will in others. If the Emperor should happen to quarrel with any of the Dukes his Vassals, and should declare them to have forfeited their Right to the Lands they hold of the Empire, the Emperor not being able of himself to turn them out of Possession, if the Arms of *Spain* should chance to be engaged any other way, so that that King could not be at liberty to put in Execution the Imperial Ban, as he usually does, the Emperor might perhaps in that case enter into a League with the Republick, allowing it to retain to its self the greatest part of the confiscated Territories. Likewise if the Emperor should ever come to an open Rupture with the Church, and should resolve to dispute his Right, it is not impossible but that, to prevail with the Republick to give him their Assistance, both in asserting his Right, and in preserving it, he would oblige himself to give the Republick some share of the Conquest. Except it be in this manner, 'tis to no purpose to hope that either the Emperor's Interest, or Inclination, will lead him to assist the Republick with his Forces.

That

That the Emperor may readily join with other Princes against the Republick, is but too evident from the Example of former Emperors, and from the Advantage to be reap'd from such an Union. The Emperor *Maximilian*, after having received a great many Benefits from the Republick, made no scruple to enter into a League against it, with his own Rival *Lewis XII.* King of *France*, whom a little before, being provok'd by repeated Injuries, he had declar'd a Rebel to the Holy Empire; altho' that King laugh'd at his imaginary Jurisdiction. If the Emperor consented to the aggrandizing of so powerful a Monarch, as that of *France*, who is frequently in War with *Italy*, and always suspected by the greatest part of the Princes thereof, it would be much less difficult at present to persuade him to unite with any other Potentate, as with *Spain*, with the Pope, or with any of the inferior Princes of *Italy*. Nay, he would enter into League with them, not only in prospect of getting some Territory to his Share of the Conquest, but even for the bare Profit of ready Money. I don't believe that the Emperor would so easily enter into a League with *France* at present, as the Emperor *Maximilian* did; because the

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Empire

Empire being now made a Partisan; and as it were a Vassal of *Spain*, if it appear'd to be against the Interest of the *Spaniards* for the Emperor to enter into any such Alliance with *France*, he would not suffer himself to be decoyed into it, neither by Promises, nor hopes. So that this doubt will be fully resolv'd, when we come to consider the State of *Spain*. But if *Spain* should desire a League against the Republick, the Emperor would not fail to go into it.

XXI.

*Whether it is
for the Interest
of the Republick,
that
France enlarge
its Dominions?*

I come now to enquire into the State of *France*. About fifty Years ago, it was not only the Interest, but the Duty of the Republick, to wish for, and contribute to the Greatness of *France*; because it was grown so much an Enemy to it self as to seek its own Destruction; and that flourishing Kingdom was then very near; either falling into a State of Vassalage to other Princes, or being dismembered into many petty Kingdoms, which is the same thing as being entirely destroyed. The Succession of *Henry IV.* to the Crown, who had his Title from Nature, and his Possession from the Sword, not only reviv'd the flourishing Condition of that Kingdom, but added so much Strength and Vigour to it, that whereas formerly it had moved

moved Compassion in every body, it came at last to raise Emulation and Envy in its Neighbours. And if the Stroke of a Knife, by the Hand of a vile Miscreant, had not put a stop to the Career of the Projects, and Life of so great a King, it would have requir'd either a great deal of Force, or a great deal of Skill, to obviate and frustrate his vast Designs. The Count of *Fuentes* was wont to brag of his having Instruments, that would set those a dancing who had no mind to it. *Henry IV.* boasted of the same thing, but with much greater reason he us'd to say, that for that time the Neutrality of the Republick was not current Coin. If he had given full Scope to his ill founded Designs, half a World would have hardly been enough to satiate his Desire. But there is no occasion of being dismayed at seeing the Billows of a raging Sea, which seems as if nothing less would satisfy it, than swallowing up the whole Earth; and yet we see that a little heap of Sand has Force enough to stop all its Fury. Death generally carries a Sitch which cuts off all fine Projects, let them be never so well laid. If *Henry III.* had brought to an end the Siege of *Paris*, which was reduced to the last Extremity; if
Philip

Philip II. had not had so often for his Enemies the Heavens, and the Sea, both *Africk* and *England* would have been now in Chains, and the City of *Paris* would have been reduced to a Village. In a word, the Fatality of humane Things is such, that all great Projects are frustrated by some unknown Cause; and likewise every Power has its own Bounds, beyond which it cannot pass. The Commonwealth of *Rome* had no greater Enemy than its own Greatness. The present Posture of Affairs in *France* has quite turn'd the Tables; and altho' the Jealousies against *France* are not quite ceas'd, yet it will have great Difficulty to preserve it self from decaying during the King's Minority. 'Tis true, the common People are grown wiser, than to shed their Blood for gratifying the Ambition of Great Men, and the most ambitious among the Grandees are now grown old, live at their Ease, and so have no other Thought but to maintain themselves in the Condition they are in. The Duke of *Mayenne*, who was Head of the Catholick League, is now well stricken in Years, and abounds with Wealth, and Governments; so that since he either knew not how to set about it, or was not willing to aspire at the Crown,

Crown, in the time of the greatest Troubles, when he wanted nothing but the bare Name of King; it would be to no purpose for him to entertain any Thoughts of it at present, now that the King is fully settled on the Throne, respected for the Memory of his Father, and beloved for his own personal Qualities. And in the State of a Subject, the Duke of *Mayenne* has no occasion to wish for a better Fortune. The Duke of *Guise*, a Man of a moderate Temper, will be desirous to see how long a Duke of *Guise* will be able to live by the Course of Nature. The *Constable*, who is farther advanced in Years than the others, is more desirous of Life, and of Children, than of a greater Fortune. The Duke of *Mercury*, who formerly pretended to erect the Dutchy of *Britanny* into a Kingdom, by virtue of his Wife's Right, is now dead in *Hungary*. The Duke of *Epernon* applies himself more to the Study of Oeconomy, than of Politicks, or of War. *Monpensier*, who has always been of the King's Party, will not now set up against him. The Marchioness of *Vernol* will now have none to back her in her Freaks, and she will have a great deal to do, to prove her self innocent of the King's Death. On

the other hand, the Prince of *Condé*, the first Prince of the Blood, a Youth of great Modesty and Resignation, has an Example before his Eyes, how his Father, Grand-Father, and Great Grand-Father, unfortunately perish'd in those Civil Wars. And he himself has already had Experience of the *Spanish* Parsimony in this his Retreat; so that if he be desirous of a greater Fortune, he may find means to come at it in *France*, and that with the Queen's Consent, who studies, as the common Report goes, to quench the Fire with Oyl. The *Hugonots* are quite weary. The Duke of *Bouillon*, their Head, is sufficiently satisfied with his Condition; and besides, if he has a mind to continue still a *Hugonot* in his Religion, there is no body will disturb him. But those Grandees make Religion always serve for a Pretext, as *Lesdiguieres* is said to do still. So that altho' no Troubles should break out in the King's Minority, yet the Republick cannot at present expect any other Protection from that Kingdom, than by way of Mediation, and Intercession, as it happen'd when the Republick was under Sentence of Interdiction, and Cardinal *Joyeuse* was sent to *Rome* on that account. Our Judgment therefore will
perhaps

perhaps be more certain with respect to this Kingdom, than the others; and that is, that it is impossible for *France* to grow powerful in a long time, and altho' that should happen, yet the Republick will have no reason to be jealous of its Power, unless it rise to an excessive degree, a thing which will at least require half an Age to bring it about, if it happen even then.

As to what pretence of Right, what Inclination, and Conveniency *France* may have to seize upon any of the Territories belonging to the Republick. There is the Inclination and Good will, which, I think, needs not to be doubted of; since Princes do always look upon one another with Wolves Eyes. But as to any pretence of Right, *France* has none at present, nor will it ever have any, till it first possess it self of the State of *Milan*. The King of *France* has no Conveniency of attacking the Republick by himself, because he cannot get at the *Venetian* Territories without passing over those of other Princes, who readily will not grant him Passage for his Troops, for fear they be made the first Prey. So that the Conveniency which the King of *France* can have of a long time, can give no Jealousie

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of Right, what
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France may
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to the Republick, which ought rather to wish for it, and facilitate it, than oppose it.

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On the other hand, as matters are at present, the Republick neither has, nor can have any Claim against the Country of *France*; because the King of *France* being wholly excluded out of *Italy*, even in that small Portion he had of it, the Marquisate of *Saluzzo*, for which he got in Exchange the Country of *Bresse*, a Country much more profitable, but not so convenient for great Undertakings, the Republick has not the least Pretext to grasp at any thing belonging to *France*. If there is no Pretence of Right, neither is there any Inclination, or Conveniency for the Republick to attack the Kingdom of *France*. For that Inclination which has no other Foundation, than barely a Desire of the Increase of Dominion, being altogether unprofitable, has no great Power over the Senate of *Venice*,

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Whether France may probably enter into a League with the Republick for conquering the Dominions of other Princes?

An Alliance between *France* and the Republick, for conquering the Dominions of other Princes, will always be the most easie to be brought about, whenever *France* is in a condition for such an Undertaking. The Examples of past Ages are a clear proof of this, as they are likewise of the Republick's

lick's having repented of such an Alliance. Now that the *French* are excluded out of *Italy*, to get footing there they will promise to the Republick considerable Shares of the Kingdom of *Naples*, and Dutchy of *Milan*. But when they have once conquer'd all the rest of the *Spanish* Territories in *Italy*, the Portions of them that are by the Treaty of Alliance allotted to the Republick, will be an Eye-sore to the *French*; and then they will enter into a League with some other Prince against the Republick, to recover what they will call their own, and to increase their Dominions with a share of what is not their own. Thus it happen'd with *Lewis XII.* who was the first that assented to the Confederacy of *Cambray*, upon the Promise of the Confederates to put him in Possession of *Cremona*. And all the while he was treating with the Confederates, he deluded the Ambassadors of the Republick, with his solemn Protestations that he would never conclude any thing to its Prejudice, concealing thus the Treaty for the space of forty Days after he had agreed to it. And then afterwards he prosecuted the War against the Republick in a most barbarous manner, causing even the Gover-

nours of the Places that were taken to be hanged.

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publick?

But should other Princes desire the Assistance of *France*, for invading the Territories of the Republick, even before the King of *France* were Master of *Milan*, let us see what, in all probability, would be the Conduct of *France* in this particular. If the Proposal came from any other Prince besides the King of *Spain*, there is no doubt but *France* would readily join with it, to have a footing in *Italy*. If it were the King of *Spain* that made the Proposal, *France* ought certainly to oppose it, and not to contribute to the Greatness of his Rival. But he would lie under a great Temptation to embrace it, in hopes of getting some Portion of the Territories of the Republick, which would make him the King of *Spain*'s Neighbour in *Italy*. And a present Benefit has usually greater Influence, than that which secures us from a remote Danger, the Distance making us flatter our selves with hopes of avoiding it. However, if such an Alliance should be concluded against the Republick, it would be necessary to stir up against *France* all the bad Humours of the Nation, or some Rival that is near to him, such as *England*. The Friend-
ship

ship likewise of the Duke of *Savoy*, if any Trust could be put in him, would be very useful, in hindering the *French* from passing the Mountains, and making Inroads into *Dauphiny* and *Provence*. But these are things at such a distance, that we may leave them to the Discretion of those that shall be then alive, when the Measures to be taken must be adapted to the Posture of Affairs at that time. For as the Times change, so likewise may the Affections, and he may perhaps be our Enemy at that time, who is now our best Friend and Ally. Thus much for *France*.

Let us now turn our Thoughts a little to *Spain*, with respect to which Monarchy it will be no difficult Task to answer all the Questions propos'd concerning other States, it being an easie matter to discover the Interest of that Kingdom. The Family of *Austria* having, from being poor inconsiderable Counts of *Habsburg*, by Marriages succeeded to the Possession of twelve Kingdoms, and of several Dutchies in *Europe*, besides the Dominions they have in the *Indies*, lets us see what vast Fortune it has had in the World, and what Industry it has employed in acquiring such large Dominions. So that if it is not stop'd

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in its Fortune by the Fatality of Humane Things, it is in a fair way to arrive at the universal Monarchy. If *Charles V.* had had as much Prudence in his Youth, as he had when he was farther advanced in Years, he would not have divided the Empire from the Kingdoms of *Spain*, and would have procured his Son *Philip*, instead of *Ferdinand* his Brother, to be elected King of the *Romans*; in which case his Son could have reasonably entertain'd Thoughts of being Universal Monarch. He try'd to persuade *Ferdinand* to renounce, but to no purpose; that Prince being wiser than to part with what had miraculously dropt into his Lap; and *Charles*, by making the Proposal, forfeited the Character of Moderation he had in the World, and the Merit of the Love and Affection he had shewn towards his Brother. The Emperor *Charles* gave another Example of his Modesty, but of which he likewise very soon repented; and that was his voluntary resigning the Government, in his own Life-time, into the Hands of his Son *Philip*; who upon the Anniversary of his Accession to the Throne, when any of his Courtiers congratulated him upon an Event that was so unexpected, he was wont to make

make Answer, That they ought likewise at the same time to condole with him for his Father's Repentance. Whether this was true, or false, it is certain, that *Philip* was not willing to commend an Action which he had no mind to imitate. For moderate Affections in a Prince are only unnatural Caprices, or rather ephemorous Imaginations, which die the same Day they are born. The Greatness therefore of the *Spanish* Monarchy is to be suspected; but then again this wild Beast has always two Hounds at her Heels, who pursue her closely, the *Turk* by Sea, and *France* by Land. Besides, *Holland* serves as an Issue to *Spain*, which drains it sufficiently of all its gross and peccant Humours. But to speak the Truth, the *Spaniards*, with all their Cunning, have for once fallen into the same Error with the Dog, who catching at the Shadow in the Water, lost the Substance which he held in his Mouth. For forty Years successively *France* had been sufficiently kept under, being intangled in Civil Wars; and during that time *Spain* might have with much greater advantage negotiated a Truce with *Holland*, if it would have laid aside those Punctilio's of declaring the *Hollanders* to be a free People,

ple, which at last it was forced to yield to. The putting an end to the War in the *Low Countries* at that time, would have turn'd greatly to the advantage of *Spain*; since his Catholick Majesty having no open War with the *Turk* after the Battel of *Santa Giustina*, would have been at liberty to imploy two thirds of his Force in making new Conquests in *Italy*. Here were at that time no other Forces but those of the Country, of which the King of *Spain* had at least one half for him, he being Sovereign of *Naples* and *Milan*; so that his Arms could not have met with any considerable Opposition. It is said, that all the Princes of *Italy*, when they are united together, may be able to counter-balance the Power of *Spain*. But what hopes is there, that ever the *Italian* Princes will enter cordially and sincerely into such an Union, which would be subject, if to no other Inconveniences, at least to that of the Vacancy of the Holy See? So that altho' such an Union may perhaps be possible in Nature, yet, being attended with such innumerable Difficulties, it will never be brought about. It might have been alledg'd as a great proof of the good Intentions of *Philip*, that he never made
any

any Attempt towards the Universal Monarchy, if he had not sufficiently declar'd to the World his desire of Dominion, by pretending first the Union of the two Crowns, then by getting the *Infanta* of *Spain* made Queen of *France*, and afterwards by seizing upon several Places. From these Demonstrations we may gather, that he was not so very moderate in his Temper, but that he has been cross'd in his Designs; he having attempted first of all to seize upon the Body of the Tree, whereas it had been more expedient for him to have begun with the Branches. The *Italians* therefore have reason to be overjoyed, that half an Age of so great danger has past over their heads, without their being reduced to any greater Servitude. At present, during the Minority of the King of *France*, the Jealousies against *Spain* may perhaps be renewed; but however *Spain* would have reason to be afraid, lest either *France*, or *England*, should imploy some powerful Motives for stirring up the *Hollanders* a-new against them, in which case the *Italians* would not fail to be assisting with their Money. So that providing the *Italians* are only able to resist the first Attacks of the *Spaniards*, they will

will have no reason to be afraid of them, since at present *France* can have no pretext for not coming to their assistance, but want of Will, whereas in former Times it wanted Force. But I hardly believe, that *Spain* will hazard the breaking of a Truce, which, after having spent much Blood and Treasure in the War, it was forced to conclude to the great dishonour and detriment of the Crown. I conclude this point with saying, that it is no ways expedient for the Republick, nor indeed for any other Prince, whether in *Italy*, or beyond the *Alps*, the Emperor alone excepted, that *Spain* should increase in Power and Dominion; and the Republick ought to hinder the growth of that Monarchy by all secret means, and even to pull off the Mask, and oppose it openly, if there is occasion.

XXV.

Whether Spain has any Pretence of Right, Inclination, or Conveniency, to seize upon any part of the Territories of the Republick?

If it be ask'd, whether *Spain* has any Pretence of Right, Inclination, or Conveniency, to seize upon any part of the Territories of the Republick, it will be no hard matter to give an answer. The Pretensions of the *Spaniard* would be to *Brescia*, *Crema*, and *Bergamo*, antiently Members of the State of *Milan*, and so very considerable ones, that these three Cities would make a very considerable Dut-
chy,

chy, and perhaps next to *Milan*, the most powerful Dutchy in *Lombardy*, So that there is no reason to doubt of the *Spaniards* looking upon these Cities with an eye of Covetousness, and of their having an Inclination to get them into their possession. And this answers the Question in two of its parts. The third part, which is always the most important, comes next to be consider'd, and that is, the Conveniency the *Spaniards* have for recovering those Places they claim a Right to. And here it will be necessary to distinguish. For the King of *Spain* will attack the Republick, either by himself alone, or united with some other Prince; and the Republick will defend it self either barely with its own Force, or in conjunction with the Forces of some other Potentate. If the King of *Spain* alone assault the Republick, when it is united with any other Prince whatsoever, whether one whose Territories lie beyond the *Alps*, or in *Italy*, he will not find it an easy matter. For the plenty of Money which the Republick has, being join'd to the Troops of another Prince, will be able to put a stop to the Arms of the most powerful Prince, and particularly of *Spain*, who has Forces enough, but at a distance; and
vast

vast Dominions, but lying scatter'd from one another. I mean however, when the Republick is united with any Prince that makes a tolerable Figure; for its Union with any of those petty Dukes would be of no avail. Besides, the Republick would be always able to create a Jealousie in the King of *Spain*, lest while his Arms were engaged in *Lombardy*, some Prince should attack him in the Bowels of his own Dominions. If *Spain*, in conjunction with any other Prince whatsoever, should attack the Republick, when it is united with *France*, instead of making Conquests upon its Neighbours, I believe it would have difficulty enough to maintain its own, because the *French* would be able, in an instant, to pour in vast numbers of Men into *Lombardy*, when they have any powerful Prince of *Italy*, such as the Republick, to receive them; and then the *Spaniard* being surrounded on one side by the *French*, and on the other by the *Venetians*, he might perhaps be in hazard of losing the Dutchy of *Milan*. But if we consider the Republick united with some *Italian* Prince, *France* standing neutral, as might very readily happen in the Minority of the King, and that *Spain* has the assistance of the Pope, and
Emperor,

Emperor, I'm afraid it would be a difficult thing for the Republick to defend itself, because that other Prince, the Republick's Ally, could not be able to give it any great assistance. The fittest Ally the Republick could have among the *Italian* Princes, would be the Duke of *Savoy*; but he would be under a continual Temptation of being brib'd over to the other Party, and likewise his Alliance would cost the Republick very dear. The richest Ally would be the Duke of *Florence*; but he lies at too great a distance from the Republick, so that I can hardly well tell what would be the event in case of an Alliance with him. If the King of *Spain* alone should attack the Republick, while it is destitute of all foreign Succour, the War would be very dangerous to the Republick, if the King of *Spain* happen'd to be free of all manner of Jealousy, from any of the Princes beyond the *Alps*, and the Event of the War could not well fail to prove fatal to the Republick, if it were carried on by Land. But should the *Spaniards* attack the Republick by Sea, I'm confident the Republick would be proof against all their Naval Force.

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Whether the
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any Pretence of
Right, Inclina-
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veniency to
seize upon any
part of the
Territories of
Spain?

As to the question, whether the Republick has any Pretence of Right, Inclination, or Conveniency, to seize upon any part of the Territories of Spain, I answer; That the Pretensions of the Republick would be to *Cremona* in *Lombardy*, and to *Monopoli*, *Trani*, and other Sea Ports of *Puglia*, both which Countries were under the Government of the Republick, before ever *Spain* claim'd any Right to them. So that if at that time the Republick set up its Pretensions, and shew'd an Inclination to recover those Places, these would not be wanting at present, if the Republick saw any Conveniency for making their Pretensions effectual. There is only one case I can think of, which might give us some Grounds to hope, and that is, if the Republick were in Alliance with *France*, and the Emperor diverted by a War against the Protestants, so that *France* might assist us against the *Spaniard*, and the Emperor could not be at liberty to assist him against us; in that case, either all the Pretensions of the Republick, or at least a part of them, might be made effectual. But still the Republick would be suspicious, lest its Allies should at last join with its Enemies, to take from the Republick all it had gain'd

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gain'd by the War, as happen'd at the League of *Cambray*.

This last Consideration may serve as an Answer to the Question, whether *Spain* may readily join with any other Prince, against the Republick. 'Tis true, I can hardly believe that, upon any account whatsoever, the King of *Spain* will attempt a League with *France* to invade the Territories of the Republick; because *Spain* would receive more damage by letting the *French* remain Possessors of one only City in *Italy*, than it could expect to reap profit, should it get all the remaining part of the Dominions of the Republick to itself. If *Spain* do not enter into a League with *France*, for recovering some part of its own Dominions which it has lost, to be sure it will never contract any such Alliance, for conquering the Dominions of the Republick.

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It is but in very few cases we can expect that *Spain* will unite with the Republick, to make Conquests on other Princes. If an Alliance were proposed, for conquering any of the Territories of an *Italian* Prince, *Spain* would never agree to it, because it is the Interest of that Monarchy not to suffer the Republick to grow greater; and it is better for *Spain* that *Italy* be

XXVIII.

Whether Spain will readily unite with the Republick against other Princes?

canton'd out into many small States, than that it be united under one Power. Besides, all the Princes of *Italy* are, as it were, Minors, under the Guardianship and Protection of *Spain*. If *Spain* were desired by the Republick to enter into a League for seizing on any of the Territories of the Pope, to be sure *Spain* would never consent, but rather oppose it strenuously; and would not fail to lay hold of this occasion to have himself celebrated as Protector of the Church. If the *French* had made any Conquest in *Italy*, *Spain* would then readily enter into an Alliance with the Republick, and bear with its increasing in Power, that it might thereby avoid the Emulation and Neighbourhood of *France*. However, notwithstanding all the Suspicions and Jealousies we have of *Spain*, it cannot be denied but its Neighbourhood has hitherto been less uneasy than that of others, even when the *Sforza's* were Dukes of *Milan*. For altho' they had not Force enough to do any great damage to the Republick, yet what they wanted in Strength, they made up with cunning and clandestine Practices. *Spain* would readily enough join its Naval Force with that of the Republick to act in conjunction against the *Turk*; as it would likewise

likewise be ready to unite its Land Forces to those of the Republick, were they to be jointly imployed against the *Grifons*, and their Neighbours the *Valesans*. And this is all I have to say on the Head of *Spain*.

It is fit we consider the State of the other *Italian* Princes, because of their Neighbourhood. And I think it would be altogether for the Interest of the Republick, that these Princes increas'd in Power and Dominion, providing they could do it at the cost of *Spain*, or even of the Church. But neither the one nor the other can they possibly do of themselves, unless the World should turn upside down. The only way they can effectuate such a thing, is by entring into an Alliance with *France*, and waiting till the *Spanish* Monarchy is tore in pieces. Then if any of the Spoil should fall to the share of these Princes, it would be so much the better for the Republick, because the *French* would have the less Dominion in *Italy*. But should one of these Princes seize upon the Territories of the other, it would be of no manner of advantage to the Republick, neither can I see any manner of good would follow from it; and then it would be a means to kindle

XXIX.

Whether it is
for the advantage of the Republick, that
the Italian
Princes increase
their Dominions?

the Fire in *Italy*; a Property of which Element is to go on its Course without aiming at any one place, and it often dilates it self to places, where they are least afraid of it.

XXX.

Whether the Princes of *Italy* have any Pretensions, Inclination, or Conveniency, to seize upon any of the Dominions of the Republick?

It will not take up much of our time to consider, whether the Princes of *Italy* have any Pretensions, Inclination, or Conveniency, to seize upon any part of the Dominions of the Republick. The Duke of *Mantoua* has some Pretensions to *Valleggio*, and *Peschiera*. The Duke of *Modena* lays claim to the Country of *Este*, from whence he takes his Name, and his Origin. But altho' their Pretensions were back'd with an Inclination to recover what they claim a Right to, yet there is no possibility of their ever having a Conveniency to make good their Claim, while they continue in the same condition they are in. For all the Princes of *Italy* united together, except the Pope, and the King of *Spain*, might well give Disturbance to the Republick, but could never endanger it; because the Territories of two of the most considerable Princes among them lie very much expos'd. The Duke of *Savoy* has some Places belonging to the Dutchy of *Milan* in the Heart of his Country;

Country ; and the Duke of *Florence* has his Territories intermix'd with those of the Church.

The next thing to be enquir'd into, is whether the Republick has any Pretensions, Inclination, or Conveniency, to seize upon any thing belonging to the Princes of *Italy* in the condition they are in. *Ferrara*, which belong'd to the House of *Este*, not being in the Hands of the Republick, it has no manner of Pretence to *Modena*, or *Reggio*. The Republick may well be suppos'd to have an Inclination to *Mantoua*, it being a Gate that opens into the Bowels of the Dominions of the Republick ; but, to speak the truth, it has but very little Pretence to it, unless it should take for a Pretence the Reimbursement of the Money which the Republick has spent in Defence of the Place. And it would still find less Conveniency to seize upon a Place of this Importance, which would alarm other Princes, and the Dance would not readily end at him that began it. It is to no purpose to say any thing here of the other Princes of *Italy*, the Republick never having had any great Concern with them. And the *Genoeses*, who formerly created so much Trouble to the Republick, have imi-

XXXI.
Whether the Republick has any Pretensions, Inclination, or Conveniency, to seize upon any thing belonging to the Princes of *Italy*?

tated the Fable of the Horse, who living in full Liberty, suffer'd himself to be bridled by Man, hoping thereby to triumph more easily over the other Animals. But *Genoua* has by this shift lost its Liberty, and, since the War of *Cambray*, has not been able, nor is it likely to be in haste, to do any great Damage to the Republick

XXXII. Whether the Princes of Italy may readily enter into a League with the Republick against other Princes; or with other Princes against the Republick? There will be no great Difficulty to engage the Princes of *Italy* to enter into a League, either with the Republick against other Princes, or with other Princes against the Republick. Because their Revenue being very inconsiderable for the Rank of Princes, they would not readily let slip any Occasion of enlarging their Dominions, or filling their Coffers with ready Mony and Pensions. The Duke of *Florence* however would not be influenced by this Motive, because he is in no want of Money, he being perhaps the richest Prince in Money of all Christendom; and his Treasure is always increasing, because those Princes of *Florence* do still retain their ancient Inclination to Trade, and Industry; which enriches the Prince without any Damage to the Subject. And perhaps it is of *Florence* alone

alone that we can say, that the Prince's Treasury is not the Oppression of the People. The Duke of *Florence* is a very considerable Prince, he being Sovereign of a Fertile Country, which lies compactly together, in the Heart of *Italy*, to which the Territories of other Princes serve as a Bulwark; so that he is put to very little Charges. This Prince is likewise to be respected, because of the Jurisdiction he has at Sea, by the means of *Leghorn*, and by his Naval Force. So that if the Republick were under a Necessity of having recourse to the Friendship of any of the *Italian* Princes, I do not know one among them whom we can more safely rely on than the Duke of *Florence*, he being free from that sordid Temptation of being bribed with Money, and being a Prince who observes still the Faith practis'd among Merchants. If the Republick have a mind to enter into a League with the other Princes of *Italy*, there will be no manner of Difficulty in it, providing the Republick supply them with Money to pay their Troops; for that they are not able to do themselves. But the Observation made by *Boccalini* of the *Italian* Princes is very lively, when he says, that they had made it their choice

to observe the Precept of *Galatens*,
That no body might impute it to
them as Ill-breeding, to eat with
both their Jaw-Bones.

XXXIII.

*The Interest of
the Republick
with Respect to
Poland.*

The Republick has no other Interest with the King of *Poland*, than their common Concern for the Christian Religion. In Matters of State there is nothing to be expected from thence, unless it were to persuade that King to make a Diverſion, when the Republick is engaged in a War with the Turk. And for that reason, it would be for the Interest of Religion, and of the Republick, that the King of *Poland* enlarged his Dominions. But he is cramp'd by the Tyranny of the Turks, and by having the Bowels of his own Country infected with Hereſie. The Kingdom of *Poland* lying at ſuch a Diſtance from *Italy*, there is no great Occaſion of making a ſtricter Enquiry into the Interest of that Crown. The Republick never had any other Concerns with the King of *Poland*, than mutual Compliments of Civility. And as the Hopes of the Republick's receiving any Benefit from thence are vaſtly diſtant, ſo there is no manner of fear of that King's being able to hurt us. It will be an eaſie Matter to cultivate a good Correſpondence
with

with that Prince; and it has hitherto always succeeded, if not in Deeds, at least in good Words, there being no common Interest between the two States to create any Misunderstanding.

What I have said of *Poland* may be apply'd to *Muscovy*, although lying still at a greater Distance from us. However, the great Duke of *Muscovy* may be sometimes engaged in War with the Turk, and for that Reason it will be convenient for the Republick to entertain a good Correspondence with him in general, leaving all particular Business to be transacted in such a manner as the Circumstances of the Times will require.

XXXIV.

The Interest of the Republick with the Czar of Muscovy.

The King of *England*, who is the most considerable among the Princes that differ from the Church of *Rome*, is a Prince of great Power, and has large Territories; and his Dominions are now become so great by the Union of the three Kingdoms, of *England*, *Scotland*, and *Ireland*, in the Person of King *James*, that they cannot well be greater. The whole Island of *Britain*, which is the largest in our Hemisphere, being now reduced to the Subjection of one Monarch, he has no more Land to conquer,

XXXV.

The Interest the Republick has to keep up a good Correspondence with the King of Great Britain.

The Maxims of the

conquer, and he has the Sea for a Wall to his Dominions; so that if *England* does not destroy it self with its own Hands, it may bid Defiance to all foreign Powers. We have an Instance of this in the fruitless Attempt that was made upon *England* by King *Philip II.* of *Spain*, when with his *Invincible Armada* he thought to lay *England* in Chains; but he lost his Labour, and came off with Dishonour in the Undertaking; and yet at that time *England* was not united to *Scotland*. The Channel is extremely dangerous to pass, and the Weather proving tempestuous, the greatest part of the *Spanish Fleet* was stranded upon the Banks and Shallows along the Coast. Queen *Elizabeth*, who has given us a Proof how far Woman's Capacity is able to reach in State Affairs, did with her Fleet extend her Dominion, even to the Indies, and attack'd *Spain* in that remote Corner of the World. She likewise put Garrisons into some of the Sea-port Towns of *Holland*, and *Zeland*, to keep them as a Security for Sums lent to the States of those Countries. So that it seem'd as if she had not been contented with her own World; for the Island of *Britain* was always thought to be a distinct World from ours.

ours. It is an Island that abounds with all things necessary for human Life, although the Inhabitants go in quest of many things from other Countries to gratifie their Luxury, and among these are Raisins, and Currans, which they fetch from the Levant. In the time of *Henry VIII*, who was the King that apostatiz'd from the Church of *Rome*, it was usual for the Kings of *England* to concern themselves with the Affairs of *Italy*; and many times the Popes, for whom the ancient Kings of *England* had always a great Veneration, and even voluntarily list'd themselves their Vassals, received great Protection from them, when they interposed their Mediation, and sometimes Threats to other Princes in their Favour, and that always to very good purpose. It is certain, the Catholick Religion has suffer'd a great Loss by having so powerful a Monarch withdrawn from its Communion, and the Court of *Rome* has lost in him a great Protector. I do not know whether to impute it to the lascivious Temper of *Henry VIII*, or to the want of Consideration in *Clement VII*. At present the King of *England* will not bear to hear talk of *Rome*, and he seems to be very little curious

curious about the Affairs of *Italy*, from which he is separated by such a tract of Sea. If this Monarch did increase in Power and Dominion, it would be much for the Interest of the Republick; because it might procure his Alliance, and by that means encrease the Respect of other Princes towards the Republick. But altho' he should not grow more powerful than he is, yet Pains ought to be taken to cultivate his Friendship; because that King having an ancient Antipathy against the *French*, and a late Quarrel with *Spain*, both one and t'other of these Dispositions are the most favourable that can happen for the Republick. 'Tis true, the present King shews a greater Inclination to fight with Arguments against the Catholicks, than with Arms against Princes; and this is his particular Genius, he valuing himself upon being an able Divine. So strong is the Prejudice of that Country against *Rome*, that the King himself studies to be a Preacher. However, I do not think the Republick ought to take heed of these things, but ought to strive by all means to preserve that King's Friendship. For wherever there is Force, which is a matter that does not depend on the Will

Will of the Prince, there is always hopes of getting it employed for our Advantage, which is a point that depends upon influencing the Passions. The means of preserving a good Understanding with *England*, will be to continue the mutual Embassies between both States, and to give strict Orders that the *English* Merchants in the Levant be well treated. But above all, the Republick ought, on every Occasion, to shew itself to be a religious Observer of its Word; because there is no Nation in the World that is a stricter Observer of the publick Faith than the *English*. And the Kings of Great Britain have not as yet learn'd this modern Lesson of Politicks; *That it is no Dishonour to lye for a Crown.*

It is greatly for the Interest of the Republick, to cultivate a strict Friendship with the Seven united Provinces of the *Netherlands*; and it would not be amiss if the Republick enter'd into a Defensive League with them, especially at present when they are in Truce with *Spain*. Such a League as this would serve as a Bridle to *Spain*, in case it should attempt any thing against the Republick; and they would consider well of it, before they laid open anew the Wounds.

XXXVI.

The Interest of the Republick to cultivate a Friendship with the Hollanders.

Wounds in the Low-Countries, which are not as yet closed up, and for which they have not Salve enough to apply to them. However, they have found means, if not to cure their Wounds, yet at least to bind them well up for some time. The Republick may likewise try to procure a greater Commerce with the *Hollanders* in Matters of Trade; for they are eager Pursuers of Merchandize, and run wherever they see a Prospect of Gain. Besides, the *Hollanders* knowing that a Political Interest obliges this Republick to be jealous of the same Power, which they are afraid of, it will be no difficult Matter to unite the Wills of the two States, because they are already united in Condition, they being both of them Commonwealths. And they have already given sufficient Earnest of their Esteem, and good Will, by an Embassie of Compliment which they sent to the Republick. Besides the Advantage of getting the *Hollanders* to make a Diversion against *Spain*, the Republick might likewise have from those Countries, on all Occasions, a considerable Squadron of Men of War with great Expedition. And now that their Country is inur'd to War, it would not be amiss if the Republick

lick levied among them some Regiments of Foot, if the Circumstances of the time when the Republick stands in need of them will allow of it. But in this Matter the Republick is to judge at the time, what will suit most with its Conveniency, when it will stand as much in need of good Troops, as of good Money.

XXXVII.

The Republick has no political Interests to adjust with the heretical Princes of *Germany*, neither can it have any Differences with them in the present posture of Affairs. If it is not well for Religion that these Princes increase in Power, yet, upon a politick Account, it happens very well that they are already so powerful as they are. Because they keep the Empire in awe, which otherwise would be a Power formidable to all the Princes of *Europe*, but more to the Princes of *Italy* than to others, and most of all to the Republick of *Venice*. So that by the means of these Protestant Princes, the Empire is kept in an even Ballance, and its Hands are, as it were, tied up for the publick Good. With these Princes the Republick will always have a good Understanding, both because they know that the Republick does
not

*The Interest of
the Republick
with the Pro-
testant Princes
of Germany.*

not pay a blind Adoration to the Interests of the Court of *Rome*, and likewise because they see the Jealousies that are between the Emperor and the Republick, from which they conclude there can be no sincere Alliance between the Emperor and us. So that as these *German* Princes will have no diffidence in the Republick, they will likewise be convinced that the Republick confides in them. As Occasion offers, it will be fit that the Republick give them Demonstrations of their good Will towards them, that, in case the State of Affairs should require it, the Republick may the more easily engage them to make a Diversion, and to allow it to levy Soldiers in their Country; which is a Matter of high Concern to the Republick, to provide in time where it may be supplied with Troops in case of Need; for in *Italy* it will get very few, and those none of the best.

XXXVIII. I have not as yet mentioned the Duke of *Bavaria*, nor shall I say any thing of him, he being so intirely devoted to the Emperor, who has honour'd him with an Electoral Vote, to the Exclusion of the Elector *Palatine*; and this bare Reflection is enough with Respect to these two Princes.

*The Republick's
Interest with
the Electors of
Bavaria, and
Palatine.*

Princes. ^b Besides, the Duke of *Bavaria* is so high in his Pretensions, that he had the Boldness to claim the Precedency of the Republick at the Council; for which Reason, I cannot say that there will ever be a good Understanding between the Republick and this Duke. So that if time should happen to bring down this Prince a little lower, I believe it would not be ungrateful to the Republick; because it is always convenient, that he who has no good Inclinations, should never have many good Troops.

The Knights of *Malta*, who are always employed in cruising along these Seas, are not risen to any considerable pitch of Greatness; wherefore they watch the more narrowly over the Motions of the *Ottoman* Port, while it is asleep. The Friendship of these Knights can be of no

XXXIX.

*The Republick's
Interest with
the Knights of
Malta.*

^b In the present Posture of Affairs, the Dispositions of these two Electors are quite contrary to what they were in *Father Paul's* time; the House of *Bavaria* being imbarck'd in an Interest directly opposite to the Emperor; and the Elector *Palatine* being now wholly devoted to the House of *Austria*. By which Adherence he hopes to recover the Dominions, and Privileges, that were taken from his Ancestors, and given to the Duke of *Bavaria*.

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great

great Advantage to the Republick except in a War with the Turk; in which Case it will be no hard Matter to bring them into an Alliance; to which they will be easily persuaded by the Hopes of getting a Booty.

XL.

Whether it is for the Interest of the Republick, that the Emperor of the Turks encrease his Dominions?

It remains now that I say something concerning the greatest Prince of the World, at least of that World which is known to us, whose Power is terrible to all, but more especially to the Republick, I mean the *Turk*. But although he is a Prince of so great Power, and one with whom we have so near Concerns, yet we know less of him than of other Princes. With Respect to him, all our Politicks are of no avail to us, our Art serves us to no purpose; he enters into Leagues with no Body, nor does he keep constant Ambassadors in any Place. In a Word, he values himself upon his slighting to make Enquiry into the Concerns of other Princes; he is like the Elephant, who, because of his own extraordinary Strength, is jealous of no other Animal. But it is likely this is a cunning of the *Alcoran*, lest their Ambassadors, by residing long in foreign Countries, should imbibe new Customs, or refine

fine their Wits in Politicks, which is a thing the *Alcoran* would have all its Followers to be entirely ignorant of. This Empire is built on the Ruin of others. The Prince does not pretend to justify his Possession by a Claim of Right; all his Justice is founded upon Force. If he has Conveniency to conquer a Country, that's all the Right to it he cares for. And when he has got Possession of a Kingdom, he lays Claim to all the Dependencies of it; and he suffers no Usurpation upon what he himself has usurp'd. Under the Government of the *Turks* every one makes Profession of Ignorance, and it is not lawful for the Subjects to enquire into any thing. It is enough for them, that they learn a blind Obedience; if they know that they are Slaves, and what the Duty of Slavery is, then they are learned enough. They are not however so ignorant, but they can dispute in Favour of their Sovereign's Claim to the Universal Monarchy, as we have seen in their Pretensions to all the Dominions of *Constantine* the Great. Neither do they admit of the Division of the Empire into *Eastern* and *Western*, which was agreed on be-

tween *Nicephorus* and *Charles* the Great; and much less do they allow of any Donation of Territories to the Prejudice of the Empire. The Emperor of the *Turks* shews but very little Devotion to his own Religion. The *Musli*, who is their High Priest, is obliged to speak of Matters of Religion with great Deference to the Will of his Sovereign, and to declare the Law conformably to the Intention, and Service of the reigning Prince, otherwise his Contumacy costs him his Life. He sets no value on any of the Qualities of the Mind; practical and speculative Virtues are unknown to him, nay even suspected by him, and for that Reason he banish'd the Ambassadors that were sent him by *Francis I.* King of *France*, because with the Sweetness of their Harmony, they soften'd the Hardness of those Hearts of Flint. He makes great account of Strength of Body, and of the Art of War; he commits great Barbarities on his Subjects. The Princes who are in greatest vogue in that Country, are they who are of the most immoderate and brutal Temper. That Eastern Monarch is wholly intent on subduing the remaining part of the World.

World. He has an infinite Number of Troops, and an inexhaustible Treasure, his yearly Revenue amounting to above twenty Millions of Crowns. And besides, he is Heir to all his Subjects that die worth any thing; for the Quality of a Slave leaves nothing to the Children, except the Arms, and a Horse. Notwithstanding all this Treasure, he is still thirsting after more Wealth, so that sometimes the Storm of his Fury is appeas'd by a golden Shower. From what I have said it plainly appears, that the Growth of the *Ottoman* Power would be pernicious to all other Princes, and that it would be a great Happiness for them to see it lessen'd. But the Hopes of this is at a great Distance, and in a manner impossible.

The Emperor of the *Turks* has no manner of Pretence of Right to any part of the Territories of the Republick; but for Conveniency, and Inclination to seize upon them, these are not wanting to him. For the great thing he aims at, is the total Destruction of Christendom. And his Force is no way unequal to the Greatness of his Design, considering that Christendom is divided in itself,

XLI.

Whether the Turk has any Pretence of Right, Inclination, or Conveniency to seize upon any of the Dominions of the Republick?

and more taken up with intestine Feuds and Quarrels, than with the Thoughts of securing itself against the Oppression of Strangers. The *Turk* dreads nothing more than a general Union among all the Christian Princes. And that he may not be negligent of his own Security, that wicked and cunning *Mahomet* has left him a Prophecy, that such an Union will happen some time or other, to the Destruction of his Monarchy. This Prophecy they never call to Mind without great Howlings and Lamentations; and therefore, to prevent the Accomplishment of it, the *Turk* labours all he can to put himself into such a Posture, as to be able to bid Defiance to all humane Power, shewing thereby how little he knows of the Force of Religion; for were the Prophecy true, no humane means could hinder the Accomplishment of it. The *Turk* therefore has no Pretence of Right to any of the Dominions of the Republick, and never had any; but he neither wants Inclination, nor Conveniency to seize upon them. If it be ask'd what Conveniency he has; I answer, He is the nearest Neighbour we have, and his Territories joyn so closely
to

to those of the Republick, that they seem all to belong to one and the same Prince.

On the other Hand, the Republick would have against the *Turk*, what he has not against the Republick; that is, a good Right to make a Conquest of part of his Dominions, which would not be properly a Conquest, but a Recovery of those Places which he has usurp'd from the Republick, and which would make a very considerable Prince. They are *Negropont, Modon, Coron, Caramania, the Archipelago, Tenedo, Bosnia, Scutari, Albania*, part of the Imperial City of *Constantinople*; and in a Word, little less than the half of the Country of *Romania*, as also *Cyprus*. If the *Turk* had not robbed the Republick, it would have been advanced to such a pitch of Greatness, as that it would have been very little inferior to the Commonwealth of *Rome*. And this will clearly appear to any one that casts his Eyes on the vast Territories which the *Turk* has usurp'd from the Republick at several times. The Republick therefore has very good Pretensions, and wants not likewise Inclination, but has no manner of Conveniency for recover-

XLII.

What Pretensions, Inclinations, or Conveniency, the Republick has to seize upon any of the Turkish Dominions?

ing its Right. So that it has Occasion for an Ostriche's Stomach, to be able to digest so hard a Morfel; but it is fit that it content itself with its present Loss, lest it should endanger the rest.

XLIII.
*Whether the
Turk will joyn
in Confederacy
with other Prin-
ces against the
Republick?*

There is one Inconvenience which the Republick is not exposed to with the *Turk*, and that is, that he will not enter into a Confederacy with other Princes against the Republick, because he never confederates with any one. 'Tis true, that in the time of *Lewis Sforza*, the *Turk* was suborn'd by him to invade the Territories of the Republick, and long before that likewise by *Visconti*, he having promis'd to hold in play the half of the Republick's Forces in *Italy*. It is said also, that *Lewis XII.* King of *France* did not fail to solicit the *Turk's* Assistance, when he assaulted the Republick by Virtue of the League of *Cambray*. But all these are not properly Alliances; they are only, as it were, Spurs to a Horse that runs of himself.

XLIV.
*Whether the
Turk will joyn
with the Repub-
lick to make
Conquests on o-
ther Princes?*

The *Turk* would make no Difficulty to joyn with the Republick in making Conquests on other Princes, whenever the Republick pleas'd to desire it; but it must resolve to yield

up

up all the Conquest to the *Turk*, he knowing no other Partnership but that of the *Lyon* in the Fable, to keep all the Prey to himself, and to leave nothing to his Partners. So that it would be Folly in the Republick to spend their Treasure and Blood in increasing the *Ottoman* Power, since it is already so great as to threaten Ruin to all other Princes. Without the Formality of entring into a League, the *Turk* would always be ready to assist the Republick with his Forces, in case it were attack'd by any other Prince; and this he has offer'd many times in the former Wars. But our wise Ancestors of those Days knew well enough, that they run a greater Hazard from their *Ottoman* Protector, than from their Christian Enemy, not so much because of the Exorbitancy of his Power, as for his want of Sincerity. So that the Republick always declin'd the Offer, and yet nevertheless the *Turk* to convince the *Venetians* of the Friendship he had for their State, did not lay hold of those Opportunities to declare War against them, but on the contrary made the Republick a Present of Salt-peter, of which it stood greatly in need.

The

XLV.

*The Republick
ought to culti-
vate a Friend-
ship with the
Turk; but to
consider him
still as one that
may be soon its
Enemy.*

The only Policy that can be used with this Eastern Emperor, is for the Republick to make great Professions of Friendship to him, but still to make account that we may have him soon for our Enemy; and therefore to be always so well upon our Guard, as that our Weakness may not encourage the natural Rapacity of the *Turks*. The Peace with them will be always more lasting, when we have Forces enough ready to make War; and a good Correspondence with them will be maintain'd more by Fear, than by Love. In case of a Rupture with them, the Republick might try to get a Diversion made in its Favour, by the *Persians* bordering on the East-side of the *Turkish* Dominions, and by the *Muscovites*, and *Polanders* to the Westward. But this is a Business that would require time to negotiate it, and the Republick must in the mean while be engaged in War, so that it could expect to reap no great Benefit by such a Breach. To corrupt the Ministers after that the War is declared, is a thing that would not be very practicable; they would be more easily brib'd in time of Peace. And an Attempt of this Nature would be very seasonable,

seasonable, for penetrating into the Counsels, and retarding the Deliberations of that Court; providing that the Person who is gain'd over be a Man of Credit, and one of the *Bashaws* of the Port, who have a deliberative Voice in the *Divan*, and more especially the *Visire*. But it happens oftentimes that these great Men take the Bribes, and then fail in performing what they undertook. Besides, they are liable to constant Changes, from the Capricio's of the Emperor, and from the Calumnies of their Rivals. The Friendship of the Queen-Mother, of the Queen-Regent, and of the *Musti*, may be of great Advantage to us. But all the Interest we can make with the Favourites of the Court will be of no avail to us, if the Prince that is upon the Throne be a Man of a resolute Temper. For these Princes are so absolute in their Command, and confide so much in their own Force, that they often begin a War without any other Motive than some sudden Freak; and all such tumultuary Deliberations are greatly applauded by the *Janizaries*, who are the Soul of that Empire. So that as I said at first, a Political Prudence can avail us but little with
this

this Eastern Monarchy; which is founded upon Fury, stands intirely upon its own bottom, without any coherence with other States, and will not so much as be guided by Reason.

XLVI.

The Conclusion. I have nothing farther to say, than what the Angel said to Gideon, *Be strong, and of good Courage.* So concluding with my hearty Wishes for the Prosperity, and long Duration of the Republick, I think I have satisfy'd your Excellencies Commands, if not in full Discharge of my Duty, yet at least in Proportion to my Talent.

F I N I S.

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